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Introducción, Resumen y Conclusiones
La industria del automóvil ha experimentado un proceso de continua evolución desde
sus inicios a principios del siglo XX. La calidad del producto ha mejorado sensible-
mente y al mismo tiempo el grado de diferenciación, medido a través del número
de variedades o modelos, ha sufrido un incremento espectacular. De una industria
caracterizada por rmas nacionales produciendo grandes cantidades de unos pocos
modelos hemos pasado a otra en el presente donde grandes multinacionales ofrecen
una gran variedad de productos en el mundo entero. El proceso de globalización ha
servido para ampliar el número de potenciales clientes, facilitando la investigación
y desarrollo de nuevos productos aprovechando la mayor escala operativa. Sin em-
bargo, también ha inducido la aparición de estrategias de gestión de producto a
escala nacional. Ambas consumen una cantidad notable de recursos. La industria
del automóvil es una de las que más dedica a investigación y desarrollo. Pero además
debe hacer frente a costes jos de entrada en los diferentes mercados nacionales y
afrontar el coste de introducir nuevos productos. La inversión anual en publicidad,
o el esfuerzo por construir y mantener una red de distribuidores dan una idea de
la enorme cantidad de recursos que las empresas deben invertir para comenzar a
funcionar en un mercado y atraer la atención de los consumidores.
Esta tesis estudia las decisiones de entrada o comercialización de nuevos produc-
tos en mercado español de automóvil, el quinto de Europa con unas ventas anuales
de mas de treinta mil millones de euros, desde diferentes perspectivas. El número de
modelos de coche se duplica durante la década de los noventa. La alta tasa de en-
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trada hace que este período sea idóneo para entender los factores que determinan las
decisiones de introducción de producto. Se hace uso de una base de datos única con
información acerca del volumen de matriculaciones y características para analizar
diferentes aspectos concernientes a las decisiones de entrada. La tesis se organiza
en tres capítulos que consisten en una introducción descriptiva y dos artículos que
enfocan el problema de entrada desde diferentes perspectivas y en un grado de com-
plejidad creciente. Los artículos han sido incluídos en su integridad y por ello existe
un cierto solapamiento entre los capítulos.
El capítulo dos presenta una descripción del mercado del automóvil español uti-
lizando la información de la base de datos así como otras fuentes alternativas. El
objetivo es, en primer lugar, describir el proceso de entrada y salida y la evolución
de precios y características en el mercado español. Todos los segmentos del mercado
muestran altas tasas de entrada. Ésto se debe tanto a la entrada de nuevas marcas
como a las decisiones de reemplazamiento de producto de empresas ya establecidas.
Los precios tienden a crecer, así como la calidad media de los coches. En segundo
lugar, este capítulo proporciona evidencia que muestra cómo las decisiones de in-
troducción de producto tienen lugar a nivel de mercado nacional. Este resultado se
obtiene a través de un análisis comparativo de los principales mercados europeos.
Aparentemente, aunque las empresas llevan a cabo su actividad de investigación
y desarrollo a nivel global, las decisiones de introducción de un mismo producto
dieren entre países. La entrada en mercados nacionales está en parte determinad
por las condiciones de la demanda. Por ello se puede distinguir entre decisiones de
investigación y desarrollo con escala mundial y la comercialización nal de los pro-
ductos que se deriven de esa etapa, decidida a nivel nacional. Este capítulo ofrece
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una justicación básica para el resto de artículos de la tesis puesto que justica
la idoneidad de los datos para analizar decisiones de comercialización frente a de-
cisiones de investigación y desarrollo, que se encuentran fuera del alcance de esta
tesis.
El capítulo tres presenta un modelo estático de entrada por parte de empresas
monoproducto. Constituye un acercamiento inicial al problema. Un nuevo pro-
ducto es introducido cuando el benecio variable es más grande que el coste jo
de entrada. Este coste varia con el segmento en que se produce dicha entrada. A
partir de las condiciones de primer orden de la maximización de benecios se puede
obtener una expresión para los benecios variables como función de las cuotas de
mercado y una serie de parámetros. Para racionalizar las diferencias observadas
entre productos que observamos como igual de rentables se introduce un shock nor-
mal idiosincrático. Esto permite la estimación de los parámetros de la función de
benecio utilizando un modelo Probit de entrada en función de cuotas de mercado.
Esos parámetros se pueden utilizar para calcular el benecio de cada producto y
la media por segmento. El principal resultado de este artículo consiste en mostrar
la relación positiva entre entrada y rentabilidad, algo esperable, y que además las
empresas preeren introducir sus productos en segmentos en los que la variabilidad
de los benecios a lo largo del tiempo es menor.
Este artículo presenta algunas limitaciones. Entre ellas está la naturaleza mono-
producto de las empresas, obviando la naturaleza multiproducto de las marcas de
automóvil. Esto implica que las estrategias de proliferación de producto no se in-
cluyen dentro del análisis. Una crítica más general puede hacerse debido al uso de un
modelo estático en dos etapas. Este tipo de modelo ignora el hecho de que aunque
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los costes de entrada se paguen una sola vez, son recuperados en varios períodos.
Estos modelos presentan también dicultades para incorporar la interacción futura
entre agentes, principalmente en decisiones de entrada y salida.
No obstante, los modelos de teoría de juegos de elección discreta han sido el
estándar para acercarse al problema de entrada durante mucho tiempo y, a pesar de
sus limitaciones, aún pueden ofrecer algunas intuiciones sobre el proceso de entrada.
En este caso, como se ha señalado más arriba, los resultados sugieren que la entrada
tiene lugar en segmentos con benecios en media mas elevados y con menor varianza.
Estas limitaciones son superadas en el capítulo cuatro. El modelo estático, ha-
bitual hasta hace poco en la literatura sobre entrada, es sustituído por un modelo
dinámico de entrada en un oligopolio, siguiendo desarrollos recientes en la mate-
ria. La unidad de decisión es la empresa multiproducto, que cada período decide
sobre la entrada y salida de sus productos en diferentes segmentos, a continuación
decide si modicar sus características y nalmente compite en precios. Todas las
empresas toman simultaneamente cada una de estas decisiones secuenciales con el
objetivo de maximizar el valor descontado de sus benecios futuros. El artículo se
centra en el estudio de las decisiones de comercialización, sin considerar decisiones
de investigación y desarrollo. Esto equivale a asumir implicitamente que existe una
etapa previa de I+D (al nivel global de la industria) de la cual una serie de pro-
ductos resulta técnicamente factible. Sobre ese conjunto de productos la empresa
elige aquéllos que serán introducidos en el mercado nacional en la etapa de
comercialización. La entrada se produce cuando el coste jo de entrar es menor
que el valor descontado de los benecios futuros. De igual manera un producto
permanece en el mercado cuando dicho ujo de benecios supera un cierto valor
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residual recuperable al salir del mercado.
Las empresas establecidas en el mercado tienen presumiblemente unos costes de
introducción de producto menores debido a la imagen de marca generada a partir
de su actividad pasada, debido a menores costes publicitarios en comparación con
empresas entrantes y debido a otros factores que afecten al éxito comercial. En
otras palabras, la distribución de costes de entrada varía con el número de modelos
comercializados por la empresa. La estimación de las diferencias in esos costes jos
de entrada sirve para cuanticar la dimension de las economías de alcance en la
comercialización. La existencia de estas economías de alcance ayudaría a explicar
las estrategias de proliferación de producto por parte de empresas multiproducto.
Los resultados conrman la hipótesis, lo cual constituye la principal aportación
del artículo. El coste de introducir el primer producto, que de hecho se corresponde
con el coste de entrada de la empresa, es signicativamente más grande que el coste
de introducir el segundo producto. Sin embargo esta ventaja de comercialización
parece extinguirse a medida que el número de modelos que posee una empresa au-
menta, sugiriendo una curva en forma de U para los costes de entrada como función
del número de modelos.
El tema no está resuelto de una manera denitiva. Los modelos dinámicos en-
trañan dicultades objeto de investigación actualmente. Esto hace necesario intro-
ducir algunos supuestos que hacen el models resoluble o estimable. En particular,
en este capítulo no se modeliza la etapa de desarrollo del producto, asumiendo que
los productos candidato a ser introducidos están, en cierta manera, dados exóge-
namente. El problema de la potencial multiplicidad de equilibrios no se considera.
Se asume que, en el caso de que existan varios equilibrios, los datos son genera-
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dos únicamente por uno de ellos y, por tanto, que las reglas de comportamiento
óptimo se corresponden con ese equilibrio. Un modelo con empresas multipro-
ducto con diferenciación de producto puede hacer que el espacio de variables de
estado sea tan grande que el problema se vuelva intratable incluso empleando las
metodologías mas recientes. Para reducir el tamaño del espacio de variables de es-
tado se introducen ciertas simplicaciones: El número máximo de empresas está
jado; no se considera la elección de características como tal, sinó que se considera
un índice de calidad que resume las características del producto; se hace uso de la
naturaleza segmentada del mercado de automóvil para reducir el espacio de com-
petidores de un modelo dado; las decisiones de entrada y salida de la empresa multi-
producto dependen del número de modelos de dicha empresa y no de la composición
particular de la cartera de productos. Algunas de estas simplicaciones son fre-
cuentes en el trabajo empírico actual en modelos dinámicos. Otras, como la investi-
gación y desarrollo de nuevos productos o la multiplicidad de equilibrios requerirán
sin duda más atención en investigaciones futuras.
 
Abstract
This dissertation focuses on product introduction decisions by multiproduct rms
in di¤erentiated product markets. The analysis is applied to the Spanish car market
in the 1990s. The dissertation is organized in four chapters. Chapter One provides
an introduction to the problem and a summary of the dissertation. Chapter Two
provides a descriptive analysis of the Spanish automobile market during the 1990s,
which is characterized by high entry rates. Chapter Three approaches the problem
of entry from a static point of view. The results conrm the positive relation be-
tween entry and protability and show that rms prefer to introduce their products
in segments where the variability of prots is smaller. Chapter Four approaches the
problem of entry using a dynamic oligopoly model of competition between multi-
product rms. The main result is that rms have incentives to product proliferation
due to the existence of important economies of scope in product entry costs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
The automobile industry has been involved in a process of continuous evolution since
its early stages in the beginning of the 20th century. Many quality improvements
have been introduced since the rst rudimentary machines appeared. At the same
time, the degree of product di¤erentiation, measured by the number of models,
has exploded. From an industry characterized by national rms producing large
quantities of few models, we arrive at present with multinational rms selling many
di¤erent products worldwide. The globalization process has increased the number of
potential customers, facilitating research and development of new products due to
the larger scale of operations. However, it has also fostered the emergence of national
or regional product management strategies. Both activities consume a large amount
of rm resources. The automobile is one of the top industries in the ranking of
research. Designing a new model entails large xed costs. On top of that, rms
face xed costs of entry into national markets and costs of introducing their new
products. The gures for annual spending on advertising and the e¤ort to build
up a dealersnetwork give an idea of the large quantity of money that automobile
rms need to invest in order to get started, to generate goodwill, and to attract
consumersattention to their products.
Analyzing from di¤erent perspectives, this dissertation studies the entry decisions
or the commercialization of new products on the Spanish car market, which is the
5
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fth largest in Europe, with annual sales of more than 20 billion euros. The number
of car models for sale doubled during the 1990s. This high ratio of entry makes
this period ideal for understanding what determines the decisions of product entry.
I use a unique data set of car registrations and characteristics to address several
aspects of entry decisions. The dissertation is organized in three chapters consisting
of an introductory description and two di¤erent papers, both of which look at the
phenomenon of entry from di¤erent perspectives and with an increasing degree of
complexity and renement. The papers have been included in their entirety and
hence the chapters show some overlap.
Chapter Two describes the Spanish automobile market using the information
from the data set as well as other alternative sources. Its rst objective is to describe
the entry and exit process and the evolution of prices and characteristics in the
Spanish market. High entry rates take place in all segments of the market. This is
due to both the entry of new rms and product replacement strategies of incumbents.
Prices tend to increase as well as the quality of the cars. Second, it provides evidence
on the decisions of introducing new products being made at the country level. This
is done through a comparative analysis of the main European markets. It seems that
although rms do research at the global level, the implementation of that research
leads to di¤erences in the introduction of new products across countries. Entry into
national markets is conditioned by demand conditions. Therefore, a clear distinction
can be made between the research and development stage at the global level and the
nal commercialization of those products, decided at the national level. This chapter
gives support to the rest of the papers by justifying the suitability of the database
for analyzing commercialization decisions as opposed to research and development
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decisions, which are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Chapter Three develops a static model of entry by single-product rms. It con-
stitutes an initial approach to the problem. A new product is introduced when the
variable prot is larger than the xed cost of entry. This cost varies with the segment
of entry. From the rst-order conditions of prot maximization, variable prots can
be expressed as a function of market shares and parameters. A normal idiosyncratic
shock is added to rationalize di¤erences in decisions from products that we observe
as equally protable. This allows us to estimate prot parameters using a probit
of entry on a function of market shares. Those parameters can then be used to
compute the protability of each product and the average prot per segment. The
main conclusion of the chapter is that there is a positive relation between entry
and protability and that rms prefer to introduce their products in segments with
smaller variability of prots over time.
This paper has some shortcomings. Among them is the single-product nature
of rms, which obviates the multiproduct nature of automobile producers. This
implies that strategic product proliferation strategies are eliminated from the analy-
sis. A more general criticism can be made about the use of a static, two-stage
framework. This ignores the fact that entry costs are paid once but are recovered
in several periods, and it also has di¢ culties in accommodating future interaction
among agents.
However, discrete choice game theory models have been the standard way to
approach the problem of entry for a long time and, despite their drawbacks, they
can still provide some insights on the entry process. In this case, as noted above,
the results suggest that entry takes place in segments with a higher mean and lower
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variance of prots.
These limitations are surpassed in Chapter Four. The static model, which had
been the usual approach in the entry literature, is substituted by a dynamic oligopoly
model of entry, following recent developments in the topic. The unit of decision is
the multiproduct rm, which rst decides on the entry and exit of products in di¤er-
ent segments every period, then decides whether to modify product characteristics
and nally sets prices. All rms simultaneously make each of those sequential deci-
sions with the aim of maximizing their present discounted value. The paper studies
only commercialization decisions, and does not consider research and development
decisions. This is implicitly assuming that there is a previous R&D stage (at the
global industry level) after which a number of products become technically feasible.
The rm then chooses those to be introduced in the national market in the com-
mercialization stage. Entry occurs when the xed cost of entry is larger than the
expected discounted value of future prots. Similarly, a product stays on the market
when the ow of payo¤s exceeds some sell-o¤ value received upon exit.
Firms that are already in the market are likely to have lower product intro-
duction costs because of the stock of goodwill generated from past performance,
because of smaller advertisement costs compared to entrant rms, and because of
any other factors a¤ecting commercial success. In other words, the distribution of
entry costs varies with the number of models owned by the rm. The estimation of
the di¤erences in these xed costs of entry serves to quantify the scope economies in
commercialization. The existence of economies of scope can help to explain product
proliferation strategies of multiproduct rms.
The results conrm this hypothesis, which is the main contribution of the paper.
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The cost of introducing the rst product, which is in fact the cost of rm entry, is
signicantly larger than the cost of introducing the second product. However, this
commercialization advantage seems to disappear as the number of models owned by
the rm gets larger, suggesting a U-shaped curve of entry costs on the number of
models.
The issue is, however, far from being closed. Dynamic models pose problems that
are the object of current research. This forces one to make assumptions that help
the model to be solvable or estimable. In particular, I do not model the product
development stage, assuming that candidates for products to be introduced are
somehow given. I am not addressing the potential multiplicity of equilibria. I
assume that regardless of the number of equilibria, the data has been generated
by the same one and therefore the optimal rules of behavior correspond to that
equilibrium. A setting of multiproduct rms with product di¤erentiation can make
the state space so large that the problem becomes intractable even when employing
recent methodological advances. I have adopted some simplications to obtain a
state space that is not too large: The maximum number of operating rms is xed;
I do not address the choice of characteristics and instead I use a quality index that
summarizes product features; I make use of the well documented segmentation of
the car market to restrict the space of competitors for a given product; the decisions
of entry and exit of the multiproduct rm depend on the number of models of that
rm rather than the particular composition of the portfolio of products. Some of
these simplications are common in current empirical work. Others like product
development or multiplicity of equilibria surely deserve more attention in future
research.
Chapter 2
A Descriptive Analysis of the Spanish Car
Market in the 1990s
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the automobile market in Spain during the
1990s. The focus is on descriptive analysis based on my data set and other sources.
I look at product turnover and at changes in characteristics and prices over time. The
chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data base, which is used to
make a report on the entry and exit patterns in Section 3 and the evolution of prices
and characteristics in Section 4. Section 5 presents some evidence from specialized
magazines. Section 6 looks at other European markets. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Data Description
I use a unique data set of monthly registrations of new cars in Spain from Janu-
ary 1990 to December 2000. These data were initially collected by, and rst used
in Moral (1999)1, who also provides a thorough description of the data base. It
includes information on listed nominal and real prices and characteristics such as
car size (length, width, weight, luggage capacity), power (cubic centimeters and
horse power of the engine, number of cylinders, maximum speed), fuel consumption,
and equipment (dummies for air conditioning, ABS, airbags, central door locking,
1The data base here, which runs from January 1990 to December 1996, has later been extended
up to December 2000.
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electric windows). It also has information on the geographical origin of the brand
producing the model. The unit of observation is the car model.
The denition of model is taken as the commercial name from industry sources.
Car models often have several variants or subvariants. In the data, a given model
denomination is associated with the characteristics of the most popular variant.
Therefore, the variation in characteristics over time is due to the variation of the
characteristics of the representative variant and not to the change of variant. The
number of registrations for a model are, however, the sum of registrations of all
variants. We can nd alternative model denitions in the literature, for example,
based on characteristics (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)). There, a model is
represented by some set of characteristics, and when these pass some threshold,
a new model is dened, even though both models maintain the same commercial
denomination. Both approaches are common in the literature on the automobile
industry (see, for example, Brenkers and Verboven (2006)).
Some lters were introduced to exclude super luxury models, e.g., Ferrari or
Rolls Royce. Models with fewer than 10 registrations per month are also excluded.
Nevertheless, the data set accounts for more than 99.9% of car registrations.
Models are classied in segments and segment denition is taken as granted
from industry sources2. In particular, I consider the following classication in eight
segments: Small-Mini, Small, Compact, Intermediate, High Intermediate, Luxury,
Sport, and Minivan. Industry reports show there is a general consensus on the
models included in each group.
The typical brand o¤ers several models in di¤erent segments. In the data, a
brand is just the commercial name of the car manufacturer.
2National Association of Automobile and Truck Manufacturers (ANFAC) Annual Report (2006),
page 57. Accessible online at http://www.anfac.es . During the 1990s, the Minivan segment was
still marginal in Spain, for which reason it was grouped in a unique category that nowadays has
split into two, following the consolidation of the segment.
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2.3 Entry and Exit
From 1990 to 2000, the Spanish market witnessed a dramatic increase in the number
of models: from an initial number of 77 models we end up with 159 by December
2000. The number of models increased constantly during the whole period even
though the total number of passenger car registrations and the real GDP per capita
remained constant (and even declined) in the rst half of the sample period (Figure
1). Therefore, variability of market characteristics like market size or purchasing
power does not seem to be enough to explain such proliferation.
In 1993, a fall in tari¤s on imported cars took place. This is a perfectly foresee-
able event that has surely had an impact on product introduction by foreign rms.
However, Figure 1 shows that in practice entry rates are pretty similar before and
after 1993. Therefore, it does not seem that foreign rms were waiting for the tar-
i¤s dismantling process to introduce a large number of new models in Spain. The
reduction in tari¤s can explain only part of the entry process in the Spanish market.
Figure 1:
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Regarding the segmentation of the market mentioned above, we can say that
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from the Small-Mini to the Luxury the di¤erences are mainly vertical, i.e., the cars
of upper segments are better. The Sport segment has some horizontal di¤erentiation
component with respect to High Intermediate and Luxury. Minivans are horizontally
di¤erentiated with respect to all other segments. The relative weight of each of them
has varied over time (Figure 2). The Small cars lost market share against Compact.
High Intermediate and Minivans also increase their shares while Intermediate follow
an irregular pattern and Small-Mini decrease.
Figure 2:
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During the sample period, we observe that the increasing trend for the number
of products applies to all groups (Figure 3).
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Looking more carefully at the entry and exit process, we see that the net increase
in the stock of models is driven mainly by the entries, with exits remaining stable
over the sample period. The most remarkable fact is the wave of entries in 1996-98
with its peak in 1997.
Figure 4:
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There are two important factors that may justify this intense process of product
entry: model replacement and product proliferation. The rst factor responds to
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the behavior of incumbent rms that periodically renew their portfolio of products
as a strategic reaction to product introduction decisions by rival rms. During the
replacement process, the new product is introduced and it competes for a while with
the old one. This is done segment by segment and the duration of the overlapping
varies from case to case depending of the relative success between the new and
the old product. Figure 5 depicts the whole range of products commercialized by
Peugeot between 1990 and 2000 and their life spans. The replacement is almost
perfect for segments (in brackets) Compact (3), High Intermediate (5), and Luxury
(6). Within the Small (2) segment, we observe longer overlaps due perhaps to the
success of the 106. This kind of behavior is common to many incumbent rms.
Figure 5: Example of product proliferation and replacement patterns: Peugeot
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The second factor is a consequence of the entry of new rms into the market.
These rms usually start with one or two models and, as they consolidate, they
introduce more and more products to o¤er the widest range of models possible. In
practice, this implies rms having at least one product in a number of di¤erent
segments. Product proliferation is also caused by incumbent rms entering new
segments. This could be interpreted as a sort of product di¤erentiation strategy
intended to reduce the toughness of competition and also as a way to attract new
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types of customers. In the example above, Peugeot does not introduce a Minivan
(segment 8) until the middle of the decade, perhaps as a reaction to other rms that
had already entered that segment.
Table 1 gives an idea of the entry and exit activity of incumbent brands. The
second column shows the number of brand models in January 1990 and the third
column the number of di¤erent segments corresponding to those models. The fourth
column shows the number of brand models in December 2000 and the next column
the number of di¤erent segments. The last three columns show the total number of
new models introduced during the sample period, the total number of models exited,
and the total number of models o¤ered (i.e., the number of initial models plus the
total number of entries), respectively. For example, in January 1990, Citroen had
three di¤erent car models, each of them in a di¤erent segment. By December 2000,
it had four di¤erent models in four di¤erent segments. During these eleven years,
Citroen introduced ve new cars and it discontinued four others, with a total of
eight models o¤ered during the sample period. It is clear from Table 1 that most
incumbents tend to enter new segments, but also to replace old models in segments
where they are already present.
Table 2 provides evidence for rms that enter the Spanish market during the
nineties (the date of entry is in the second column). In this case, it is clear that,
in relative terms, newcomers introduce many more models than incumbents, most
likely in an attempt to catch up.
Product proliferation is therefore quite important during the decade and it is
more intensively developed by new brands on the market.
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Table 1: Product entry and exit by incumbents
Initial number of: Final number of: Total number of:
Brand Models Segments Models Segments Entries Exits Models
Citroen 3 3 4 4 5 4 8
Fiat 4 3 8 6 12 8 16
Ford 5 5 8 6 8 5 13
Mazda 2 2 5 5 4 1 6
Opel 5 4 7 6 7 5 12
Peugeot 5 5 6 5 6 5 11
Renault 6 5 6 6 5 5 11
Rover 4 4 3 3 13 14 17
Seat 3 3 6 5 5 2 8
Toyota 3 2 6 4 7 4 10
Volkswagen 6 5 7 6 5 4 11
Table 2: Product entry and exit by new entrants
Date of Initial number of: Final number of: Total number of:
Brand entry Models Segments Models Segments Entries Exits Models
Chrysler Feb. 1992 2 2 6 4 7 1 7
Daewoo Mar. 1995 2 2 6 5 8 2 8
Galloper Nov. 1998 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Hyundai Jan. 1992 4 4 7 6 9 2 9
Kia Jan. 1997 3 3 7 3 8 1 8
Mitsubishi Jan. 1990 1 1 3 3 3 0 3
Subaru Jan. 1991 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Suzuki Jan. 1990 1 1 3 3 5 2 5
Chapter 2: A Descriptive Analysis of the Spanish Automobile Market 18
Table 2 shows that a large part of the product proliferation e¤ect is due to Asian
manufacturers. Indeed, their market share steadily increases over time compared to
European and, more signicantly, to American manufacturers (Figure 6).
Figure 6:
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2.4 Prices and Characteristics
Average real prices tend to increase after an initial period of decline due to the
economic crisis in the rst half of the decade (Figure 7).
Chapter 2: A Descriptive Analysis of the Spanish Automobile Market 19
Figure 7:
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
10.5
11
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
14.5
14
15
16
17
18
24
26
28
30
20
25
30
35
14
16
18
20
22
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
Small-Mini Small Compact Intermediate
High Intermediate Luxury Sport MiniVan
A
ve
ra
ge
 re
al
 p
ric
e
Year
Average real price per segment
However, the average quality of cars increases over the period as well, such that
quality adjusted real prices remain constant or even fall during the decade. Appendix
1 collects some gures depicting the increase of some selected, representative car
characteristics leading the quality change. If we look at averages per segment, we
see that the size and weight increase over time, leading to bettercars (for the Sport
segment the feeling is usually the opposite: good sport cars are small, fast and
powerful). The maximum speed and the power of the engine have also increased over
time, although not so steadily. Also, the proportion of cars with air conditioning,
anti-lock braking system (ABS) and driver airbag has increased during the whole
period. These characteristics have been considered proxies for quality or luxury
grades of car (e.g., air conditioning in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)) and they
clearly show that the quality of all segments has increased, although it increased
sooner in the higher-quality segments, as one might expect.
The changes in average characteristics for the Small-Mini and Minivan segments
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are a¤ected in part by the small number of models, which makes new entries have
a large inuence on the averages. In the rest of segments, the number of models is
larger and the averages show a smoother pattern.
In the second part of the appendix, I report the change in car size, horse power,
and maximum speed for some selected models. I pick those three characteristics to
keep the exposition simple but the results apply in general to all the characteristics
mentioned in the by-segment analysis. I have selected the models from the set of
most popular cars in the sample, trying to balance the brands, segments, and brand-
origin representation. The main conclusion that can be drawn from those pictures
is that quality is also changing over time for specic models. Firms seem to adjust
some characteristics of their products from time to time. The rationale for that is
to keep track of consumer needs and also to respond to competitorsentry and exit
decisions, which a¤ect the average quality of a given models competitors. Changes
are usually small, as we could expect, because if the change needed were very large,
the most likely best response would be the introduction of a new model. Finally, the
frequency of changes varies from one model to another with no particular pattern
by rm or segment: some models change frequently while others do not change at
all (at least during the sample period).
2.5 Evidence from Specialized Car Magazines
This section summarizes the casual evidence obtained from automobile magazines
on the issue of changes in characteristics. It is based mainly on news taken from
the online car magazine of the Spanish newspaper El Mundo3. I have reviewed
several editions from the last two years. Although these two years are not part of my
3Available at: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundomotor/index.html . pdf copies of the news and
reports used for this section are also available from the author. I can provide a translation into
English for those which are in Spanish.
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sample period, it does not seem di¢ cult to assume that the same kind of behavior
may have happened in the past.
Firstly, there is strong evidence of segmentation in the market. When a newmod-
els arrives, it is immediately associated with a set of competitors and this becomes
public information for both consumers and producers4. This fact gives support to
particular demand modelling strategies such as Nested Logit.
Secondly, it is easy to nd news related to variation of characteristics. In general
terms, rms tend to modify the design of the car and/or its technical characteris-
tics. Usually those changes in characteristics are small but relevant. They are also
advertised and di¤used and they entail some costs of adjusting production. Many
brands behave like that. I have collected evidence for several models, among them
the Ford Mondeo, Volkswagen Golf, Renault Twingo, Skoda Fabia, Volvo V70, Toy-
ota Avensis, and Opel Astra. Therefore, there is evidence on changes in the quality
of cars over time, and these changes are intended to attract demand and to relaunch
the protability of an existing model (e.g., the new Renault Twingo).
Finally, we can also nd some evidence regarding the level at which some deci-
sions are made. The development of new models is decided at the global industry
level. However, the decisions to introduce those new products seem to be made
at the regional market level, which in Europe basically coincides with a country.
Therefore, conditions of local demand inuence product entry and exit decisions,
but also the modication of existing products. For example, it is reported that
the Volvo V70 was rst introduced in the Scandinavian market and would then be
progressively introduced in the remaining European countries.
4For example, the introduction of the new Renault Laguna taken June 4, 2007:
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundomotor/2007/06/04/coches/1180975643.html
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2.6 Evidence from European Car Markets
This part looks at the evolution of characteristics in ve di¤erent countries (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, and the UK) using a data set available at Frank Verbovens
website5. Verbovens data set uses slightly di¤erent denitions of model but it has
information on similar characteristics. For the sake of simplicity, I present here some
description of one characteristic (horse power). The evidence from other relevant
characteristics is qualitatively the same.
The set of graphs presented in Appendix 2 give an idea as to what is going on.
The rst two graphs (Figures 18 and 19) depict the entry and exit process for a
number of models in each of the ve countries. A sample of car models is listed on
the x-axis, and the year of entry is on the y-axis. Each country is represented by a
di¤erent symbol so, for example, the rst model (coded as x = 100) was introduced
in France in 1993 and in other countries in 1994.
Figure 20 shows the dispersion of horse power in each country for a sample of
models. This graph must be read as follows: on the x-axis we have a sample of
models listed from 1 to 30; horse power is on the y-axis. Take, for example, model
number fteen and look at the vertical line passing through x = 15. If there is more
than one dot over the line, this means that this characteristic has changed at least
once. If characteristics did not change at all, then there would be only one dot per
model.
Figure 21 plots the evolution of horse power for a sample of models. This graph
is read as follows: the year is in the x-axis and horse power in the y-axis. Take the
year 1995 and consider a vertical line passing through it. If there is more than one
dot over that line, this means that horse power in 1995 was not the same in the ve
countries, i.e., the characteristics of cars are di¤erent across countries even for the
5http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/NDBAD83/frank/cars.htm
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same model.
The graphs suggest the following:
 Entry is usually not simultaneous in all countries. Gaps of two or three
years across countries at the moment of entry are frequent, especially for non-
European producers. Those gaps are wider and even more frequent for exit
decisions. These two facts suggest that entry and exit are inuenced by na-
tional market conditions.
 Characteristics change for a large proportion of models in all countries. Notice
that if characteristics did not change at all, we would have a graph of a curve
instead of a cloud. Computations from the data base induce us to think that
there is a rate of change of 50% of the observations overall (not so di¤erent
from my data).
 The change is not always the same in all countries and evolution by country
does not overlap.
 The amount of the change in characteristics is not large.
 I can capture changes in observed characteristics (engine, size, etc.) but I
cannot capture changes in design. The important thing is that changes are
almost always in both observed and unobserved characteristics.
2.7 Conclusion
From the descriptive analysis above, we can conclude that the Spanish automo-
bile market shows a dramatic increase in the number of products that corresponds
mainly with rmsproduct proliferation strategies, although there is some inuence
of product replacement behavior. Firms introduce new products, apparently to keep
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track of consumer needs, but they also try to increase the life span of current prod-
ucts by modifying their characteristics. The empirical evidence suggests that those
decisions are made on a regional / national basis, rather than at the global market
level. Therefore, the main question to be solved is to explain how and why rms nd
it protable to expand their range of products by estimating product entry costs.
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Appendix 1: Evolution of Car Characteristics
By Segment
Figure 8:
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Figure 11:
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Selected Models
Figure 15:
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Appendix 2: Figures for European Car Markets
Figure 18:
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Figure 21:
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(Interpretation: For each model and for each year, the dots represent the observations of horse power in each of the five countries
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 characteristic varied across some countries.)
Evolution of Horse Power for selected models
Chapter 3
Entry and Protability in Di¤erentiated
Product Markets: The Spanish Car Indus-
try
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies product entry decisions in the Spanish car market, the fth-
largest in Europe with annual sales of more than 20 billion euros. I understand by
entrythe introduction of a new model that then competes against the incumbent
models for a stake of the market. This means I am not considering the entry of a rm
itself; rather I want to model and describe when and why a new car model arrives
on the market. Common sense indicates that rms are willing to introduce a new
product when the expected revenue exceeds the xed (or sunk) cost of development,
which includes, for example, the R&D costs, plant setup or adaptation costs and
advertisement costs.
I propose a two-stage, static model where rst the decision of entry is made
and then there is price competition. I assume single-product rms. These two
assumptions make the analysis much simpler but they also have an impact on the
results. A two-stage static model implies that for a product to enter in the rst stage,
the entry costs must be fully recovered in the price competition stage. In reality, this
is not the case in the car industry, where product entry costs can be recovered during
many periods. As a result, the model will imply entry rates smaller than the actual
ones because entry is more di¢ cult. In other words, this model cannot explain some
36
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part of the high real entry rates. The single-product assumption eliminates any
strategic consideration of the rm regarding product proliferation, as for example
entry deterrence behavior. We can expect more entry with respect to the multi-
product rm case as the cannibalization e¤ect is not taken into account. It is not
clear whether these two e¤ects compensate each other or one is stronger than the
other, leaving the global e¤ect undetermined.
The two-stage approach is common in the related literature and static approaches
to the entry problem are not rare, as discussed below. The single-product assumption
is an unusual one that I am making in this chapter for the sake of simplicity. The
goal of the chapter is to get some insights into the phenomenon of entry using a
simple model.
This chapter is inspired by and follows the literature on entry and competition
in oligopolies. Many papers have addressed the issue of entry but most of them, es-
pecially in the early literature, focus on the number of rms the market can sustain
and how many can enter/exit. For instance, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b) propose
a model that accounts for the number of entrants and a decision about entry based
on having non-negative prots. However, the product is homogeneous and poten-
tial entrants are all identical. The focus of their paper is on competition and the
evolution of market structure, so they do not consider rm specic analysis of the
determinants of entry. Berry (1992) presents a two-stage model where rms rst
decide to stay or to leave and then they compete and earn prots. He provides
conditions under which the equilibrium number of rms is unique but the identi-
ties of the entrants remain undetermined (this is similar to Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991a), where a given market structure is compatible with several empirical obser-
vations). Prots drive the decision about entry. Variable prots are a function of
market characteristics and market structure but do not explicitly depend on rms
strategies. Mazzeo (2002) is another two-stage di¤erentiated product model where
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rst entry and quality are decided and then rms compete. Prots are empirically
characterized by a set of market demand characteristics and market structure. A
general discussion of papers in this literature can be found in Toivanen andWaterson
(2000).
More recently, we nd other works that look at entry and / or competition in a
more structural way, although still from a static perspective. Ishii (2005) presents a
model for ATM networks in the banking industry where the bank rst chooses the
size of the network and then competes in prices (interest rates). In Seim (2006), rms
rst decide on entry and then they di¤erentiate by choosing geographic locations.
Entry in the car market has been approached using reduced-form econometric
models. Using UK data, Geroski and Murn (1991) use a probit model to esti-
mate the probability of entry as a function of post-entry advertising shares. They
nd evidence that usually entrants go rst to the higher segments and then to the
smaller ones. Moreover, prior experience in the market has a small e¤ect on entry.
Geroski and Mazzucato (2001) explain entry as a function of advertising in the US
automobile market. Requena-Silvente and Walker (2005) study the relation between
model survival and competition in the UK. They nd evidence that intra-rm com-
petition determines the exit of car models in small and large family cars, while in
the Luxury/Sport segment, the relevant factor is inter-rm competition.
The Spanish market has been studied from the point of view of pricing behavior
(Jaumandreu and Moral (2006)) and the role of advertising (Barroso (2007)).
In order to see the magnitude of the phenomenon of entry, I start by describing
the industry from the point of view of entry-exit decisions. Section 3 describes the
data base used. Section 4 presents a preliminary probit analysis describing corre-
lations between entry and some relevant variables. The rules of rm and consumer
behavior are presented in Section 5. The empirical implementation is in Section 6
and results are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Chapter 3: Entry and Protability in Di¤erentiated Product Markets 39
3.2 Entry (and Exit) in the Spanish Car Market
During the 1990s
The period 1990-2000 shows an increasing trend in the number of models marketed
(Table 2).
There are two main reasons behind this fact. Firstly, the Spanish market opened
to foreign producers as a result of becoming a member of the European Community.
Secondly, there is an increase in the number of models marketed by rms. I look at
each one in more detail.
The entry of Spain into the European Community entailed a progressive reduc-
tion in the tari¤s for imported cars in order to converge to the rates applied in
the Union. This fostered the entry of many foreign producers, whose cars became
cheaper. The evolution of tari¤s is shown in Table 1. 1993 is the cut-o¤ point.
However, this does not appear to have a striking inuence on the number of models
marketed. Even if we consider that the introduction of a new model by a newcomer
could be delayed until a commercial network is developed, i.e., e¤ective entry may
take some time after liberalization, this lag is not enough to explain the phenom-
enon of entry because the end date of commercial barriers was known and could have
been anticipated. Table 1 shows that 1996 is somehow a breaking point after which
the introduction of models speeds up, the main reason being the intensive entry by
some (mainly Asian) newcomers. Figure 2 represents the proportion of the number
of models marketed by domestic1 rms (darker line), Europeans and others (thin
line), including Asian and American producers. For example, the gap between lines
2 and 3 represents the presence (in terms of number of models marketed, and not in
terms of market share) of Asian and American producers. This presence becomes
1Firms with production plants in Spain are considered domestic, no matter their country of
origin or ownership. European producers are those producing in Europe but not in Spain. All
remaining rms are classied as "Other" rms.
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signicantly greater circa 1996, and it focuses on the small-medium range of models.
The average (average by year and brand) proportion of entries per segment2 in
the sample period is between 2% and 8% . Those proportions are computed as
follows: I generate an entervariable with 2904 observations (the combination of
8 segments, 11 years and 33 brands) that has a 1 if a brand in a particular year has
introduced a model and a 0 otherwise. Then I compute by segment the proportion
of ones. This procedure assumes that all the rms in our sample could have made
a decision about entry at any moment of the sample. This is not realistic, because
that was not possibly the case of most Asian producers. Moreover, following that
argument, I could consider that any rm with or without a presence in the Spanish
market could have entered, which would have forced us to include all manufacturers
in the world. Therefore, a renement on that procedure is to exclude a rm while it
has not entered the Spanish market for the very rst time. This a¤ects only Subaru,
Chrysler, Hyundai, Kia, Daewoo and Galloper, which entered the Spanish market
for the rst time after 1990. But it could also be the case that a rm leaves the
market entirely and never comes back. In this scenario, it would not make much
sense to include it as potential entrant in each period. This a¤ects Yugo and Lada.
The remaining rms are all present in every year in at least one segment. Therefore,
if I forget about the rms that have not entered yet or which have left permanently,
I get a le of 1075 decisions of enternot enter. Computing the proportions of
entry yields a pretty stable number of 15 % (Table 5). The average level of entry
in the whole sample is roughly the same for all segments (it goes from 12.5% in the
Luxury segment to 16.4% in the Compact segment. The 28.5% gure of the Minivan
segment is due to the fact this is a really new segment and the process of entry is
more intensive). By economic origin, domestic rms have a proportion of entries of
2I consider here the following 8-segment classication taken from industry sources: Small-Mini,
Small, Compact, Intermediate, High Intermediate, Luxury, Sports, and Minivan.
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10% for 20% of foreigners. Domestic rms, already present in most segments, just
make a replacement e¤ort and eventually enter new segments. By contrast, foreign
rms (especially Asian) enter the Spanish market and also have to undertake model
replacement.
Regarding the increase in the number of models marketed by rms, a glance at
Figure 3 shows that almost all rms maintain or increase the number of models for
sale in the sample period. Exceptions are short-lived brands and Rover. Tables 3
and 4 show how newcomers tend to occupy all niches and incumbents tend to
reinforce their presence. Indeed, 6 out of 8 rms with no activity up to December
1989 were present in at least 3 segments by the end of 2000. Paradigmatic examples
are Hyundai and Kia. Incumbents either maintain or increase the number of models
for sale and the segments where they are present with an intensive activity of entry
and exit of models. This can only correspond to replacement decisions in most cases
(for example Renault, Ford, Peugeot).
In summary, apart from trade liberalization, there are at least two reasons behind
the entry and exit decisions of each producer:
First, replacement decisions. A number of entry decisions, i.e., the introduction
of a new model, is associated with a correspondent exit, in such a way that the rm
just replaces one model with another, maybe with some degree of overlapping. The
lifetime of a car model is limited and rms must keep on renewing their range of
products in order to satisfy consumerstastes3.
Second, net entries. These are related to the creationof new segments or new
3Actually, in the early stages of the industry, the strategy of di¤erentiation to meet local
demands tastes was the only way, along with trade barriers, for the European producers to compete
with the cheaper, mass-produced American cars. Later, when free trade started to emerge within
Europe and the national producers were able to take advantage of the economies of scale from
serving a larger market, the strategy of di¤erentiation was revealed as the critical determinant of
the leadership of the European car industry in the subsequent decades. We could say that the
1960s was the period when product di¤erentiation in the car industry was born. [See Altshuler,
Anderson, Jones, Roos, and Womack (1984)]
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bundles of characteristics signicantly di¤erent from the existing ones. Examples of
this are the introduction of the Minivan or the increasing popularity of the urban cars
(Small-Mini segment). By contrast, some segments may become sort of unpopular
and lose weight in the industry. This seems to be the case of the Intermediate
segment, whose number of models declines as the Compact and High Intermediate
segments go up.
3.3 Data Description
I use a unique data base of car model registrations in Spain over the period 1990-
2000. These data were initially collected by, and rst used in Moral (1999)4, who
also provides a thorough description of the data base. The unit of observation
is a car model. A model is dened in the sample by its commercial name, as is
common in the literature on the automobile industry (e.g., Brenkers and Verboven
(2006)). The price and main characteristics of the car (such as power, speed, fuel
consumption, dimension, ABS or air conditioning among others) are available in a
monthly basis. Table 6 describes the characteristics used and their units of measure.
The sample is ltered to exclude super luxury models (e.g., Ferrari, Rolls Royce)
and cars with fewer than 10 registrations per month. Nevertheless, the sample
represents more than 99% of total registrations during the sample period. Car
producers usually o¤er a number of variants of each model. For each model, the most
popular variant is chosen as representative of model characteristics. Therefore, the
observed variation in characteristics will correspond to changes in characteristics of
the representative variant. All registrations from the other variants are attributed to
the representative one. Models are grouped according to an 8-segment classication:
Small-Mini, Small, Compact, Intermediate, High Intermediate, Luxury, Sport, and
4The data base here, which runs from January 1990 to December 1996, has later been extended
up to December 2000.
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Minivan. Table 7 shows as an illustration some examples of car models included in
each group. The classication is taken from industry sources5.
3.4 Descriptive Probit Analysis
The depiction of the empirical framework can be completed by looking at the cor-
relations among variables that arise in a probit model. I explain the probability of
entry with some basic variables that attempt to capture rm characteristics (but
not rivalscharacteristics) and some market characteristics. In particular, I use: the
average real price of cars, as a proxy or index for the bundle of characteristics, the
total number of models of each rm (proxy for variety), the age of the oldest model
for each rm (proxy for the incentive to replace old models), the proportion of en-
tries over the total number of models in each period, and the ratio of segment sales
over total sales (proxy for the importance of entry in some segments). I also include
dummy variables to control for year, segment, economic origin of the rm (domes-
tic, European or other), and tari¤s. These controls intend to capture some market
characteristics such as the intensity of foreign competition or the economic cycle.
Using prices as a proxy for characteristics could entail some endogeneity problems.
This may also be the case of variables based on sales or proportion of entries. Being
aware of this issue, I maintain those regressors because I am using this probit just
as a simple preliminary way to study correlations among entry and rm and market
characteristics. Hence, the insights from this section are conditioned by that caveat.
I consider the non-augmented sample (1075 observations), partially-augmented
sample (2584 observations) and the augmented sample (2904 observations), dened
as in the previous section Table 8 reports a brief summary of results.
The best results are given by the parsimonious specications of Table 8 with
5See, for example, the industry report for Spain, ANFAC (2006).
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no dummies for year or segment for any of the alternative samples. In these, all
coe¢ cients are highly signicant and moreover robust to several probit specications.
The remarkable ndings are the positive sign for the coe¢ cient of the number of
models and negative sign for the age of the oldest model. This can be interpreted
as the existence of a strong correlation or clusteringin the decisions of entry. The
negative sign of maxagemeans that the probability of entering increases as the
contemporaneous mean average of the models marketed decreases. This average is
computed each period taking into account the age of the newmodels; hence, if
for some reason many models are introduced at the same time, the average will be
smaller and at the same time entry is high. If rms do not coordinate or enter at the
same time, spreading entries over time, we should not observe a deep fall in mean age
nor a signicant amount of entries, thus having a pair of uncorrelated variables. This
is not the case, as the coe¢ cient appears to be highly signicant in all regressions
run. This correlation is not surprising if we look at Table 2, where entries take place
intensively in certain years. The positive sign of numberindicates that the more
models there are on the market, the more likely entry is, thus feeding back the stock
of models sold. This reects the fact that entry rates speed up in the sample period.
Notice that there could have been an increase in the total number of models as a
consequence of smaller exit rates and stable entry rates. The positive coe¢ cient tells
us that, no matter what happens with exit, entry is fostered as variety increases.
The other variables have the expected signs: higher real prices are positively
correlated with entry, European and Asian-American rms enter more intensely
and the higher the importance of a segment, the more likely entry is. The tari¤s
variable should have a negative impact but it is non-signicant most of the time
(although when it approaches signicance its sign is indeed negative).
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3.5 Agent Behavior
3.5.1 Consumer Behavior
In this part, I follow the well established literature on random utility models (An-
derson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992)). As I consider the case of single-product rms
competing in prices, the baseline demand model is the standard multinomial logit
with price competition. Consumers demand either one unit of the good or none.
They derive utility from the characteristics of the product. The utility from con-
suming product i is given by: Ui = ki   pi + !i + i = ui + i where pi denotes
the price,  stands for the marginal utility of income, ki is a quality index summa-
rizing the observable characteristics of the good, and !i is an unobservable product
characteristic. i is an idiosyncratic error term; the 0is are assumed to be iid with a
type I extreme value distribution.  is a parameter proportional to the variance of
the 0is, measuring the degree of product heterogeneity. Denoting by M the market
size, total demand is Di = SiM , with market share, Si, given by:
Si =
exp

ui


1 +
NX
j=1
exp

uj


3.5.2 Firm Behavior
Firms are prot maximizers that compete by playing the following stage game:
they rst decide whether to enter with some given characteristics, summarized by
the index k, which has an associated cost given by F (ki). Then they compete in
prices, having observed the results of the rst stage. Therefore, the model accounts
for the relation of entry with price competition. F (ki) is not a production cost, it
is the cost associated with entering with quality ki (it might include a number of
elements such as the R&D cost , advertising cost, or design or plant modication
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needed). The product can be replicated at a constant marginal cost of production
C (Di) = ciDi .
Prots from product i , if it has entered, are dened by:
i = (pi   ci)SiM   F (ki) (1)
and zero if the product is not on the market (its market share is zero):
i =
8><>: (pi   ci)SiM   F (ki) ; if entry0 ; if no entry
Maximizing (1) with respect to price we obtain:
MSi +M (pi   ci)  

Si (1  Si) = 0
such that if entry happens in the rst stage, variable prots are:
vi =


Si
1  Si
3.6 Empirical Model and Estimation
In the rst stage of the game, entry takes place if it is more protable than staying
out. As in Geroski and Murn (1991), I formulate a probit of entry, although in my
case it is based on the equation of prots. Lets denote by  an iid normal random
shock, i s N (0; 1). Then:
Pr (entry) = Pr (i > 0) = Pr (E (
v
i )  F (ki) + i > 0) =
= Pr (i >   (E (vi )  F (ki))) = F (E (vi )  F (ki))
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where expected variable prots can be dened as: E (vi ) =


E(Si)
1 E(Si)M . The market
size, M , is approximated by the number of households per year.  is obtained from
demand estimation.
I pool the data to t the probit model. This is equivalent to assuming that rms
behavior is independent from one wave to another.
Characteristics inuence the demand for a model, so it seems reasonable to
include them as determinants of the decision of entry: whether to enter or not is
as relevant as where to enter. Therefore, entry, choice of characteristics and (price)
competition are closely linked. However, in this model, I abstract from the choice
of characteristics (the choice of segment) and I concentrate on the relation between
entry and competition. This simplication is also consistent with assuming rms
taking independent decisions across segments: Ford in the Small segment behaves
as if it were a di¤erent rm from Ford in the Intermediate segment.
The issue of expected market shares deserves some discussion. We observe the
characteristics and sales of the products that successfully enter, so I can assume
perfect foresight and consider that the market share expected a priori is the same as
that which is realized a posteriori. What about the failed entries? i.e., how can we
approximate the expected market share of a model which has not entered? Here we
have two possibilities. First, the segment-rm has never been present in the Spanish
market. In this case, I do not consider it a potential entrant until it enters for the very
rst time. This is equivalent to assuming that the rst entry of any rm is always
successful and that if I have not observed it in a particular market, it is because the
rm does not want to do it, whatever the reason (dimension, international presence
policy, etc.). If I do not make this assumption, I would have to regard as a potential
entrant any car producer of the world. Second, the segment-rm has entered before.
In this case, there are at least two alternative approximations of the market share:
 Approach 1: if the rm already has a product for sale and I can assume that,
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had it been able to introduce another product, it would enjoy the same market
share, i.e., the failed entrant is at most (and in the limit equal) as good as
the incumbent product. Therefore, there are observations for each product
in several years; some of these correspond to entry periods while others do
not. What I am assuming is that in the periods where there is no entry but
the segment-rm is still present, the characteristics and expected share of the
failed product are equivalent to those of the product already present. The
segment-rm would enter only with a product better than the one it is
currently o¤ering.
 Approach 2: I estimate the parameters of demand and use these estimates to
simulate the expected market shares an entrant would have. Using the data on
characteristics and prices, I can compute the associated market share6. This
can be regarded as the share rms expect to get by introducing a model with
those particular characteristics. The assumption here is that failed entrants
would have entered with the same characteristics as the oldmodels, i.e., the
failed entrant is at most as good as an existing model. Details on demand
estimation are given below.
I only have to estimate the ratio 

which is likely to vary across segments, so I
interact Si
1 SiM with segment dummies to control for that.
I adopt a simple form for the xed cost function that makes it vary with segment
instead of varying with ki. Therefore, I will be estimating a xed cost of entry by
segment. I also introduce a set of dummies to control for origin (either domestic,
European or non-European rm) and a count of the models each segment-rm has
6What I have done is the following: from my original sample, I have obtained a simplied data
set with one observation per segment, year, and brand. For each observation, I observe the average
of the relevant characteristics and prices. Using this information and the estimation of demand
parameters, I compute the market share. This is the simulated market share used later in the
estimation of the structural equation.
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per period (to control for synergies between models at the time of entry).
3.6.1 Demand Estimation
I estimate the market share of each product. Normalizing by the outside good and
taking logs produces the standard equation:
lnSi   lnS0 = ki   pi =
X
c
acc   pi
The quality index, ki, is obtained as the weighted sum of characteristics, denoted by
ac, using as weights their correspondent parameters from demand estimation, the
cs. From the basic model, a sensible econometric specication is:
lnSi   lnS0 =
X
c
ac;ic   spi + s + f + i + i (2)
where s is a segment-specic marginal utility of income obtained by interacting with
segment dummies. As segmentation has a vertical component, we can expect that
consumers buying from higher segments have lower  than those buying from lower
ones. s; f ; i are, respectively, segment, rm and product unobservables (observed
by consumers but unobserved to the econometrician). i is the idiosyncratic error.
3.6.2 Empirical Specication of the Demand Equation
The market share of the outside good is computed as a residual from the total
amount of sales.
A reduced amount of characteristics has been chosen in order to conform to the
existing literature (see, for example, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) or Jau-
mandreu and Moral (2006)). In particular, I consider the cubic centimeters/weight
ratio, the car size (length times width), the kilometers run with one litre of fuel,
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maximum speed, air conditioning, and ABS. I introduce a set of dummies to control
for rm and segment unobservables and the age of the model (in levels and squared).
I estimate equation (2) using two- stage least squares. Endogeneity of prices is con-
trolled for by instrumenting them with a 12-month lagged deviation with respect to
their individual time mean7, as suggested in Arellano and Bover (1995), and the un-
observed product component is considered to be a random e¤ect, i.e., it is assumed
to be uncorrelated with the remaining explanatory variables.
Table 9 presents estimation results. An increase in any characteristic means
a better car, so the positive sign obtained in the estimation is what is expected.
Price coe¢ cients are negative for all segments but the Small one, the reason for
this unclear. In any case, it is clear that the marginal utility of income is di¤erent
among segments. In particular, for the segments that can be ordered vertically
in quality (Small-Mini, Small, Compact, Intermediate, High Intermediate, Luxury),
we observe a higher marginal utility of income for the lower ones.
These estimates are then used to simulate the market share that would corre-
spond to some set of given characteristics, as described above.
3.7 Results
The estimation of structural probit following approach 1 yields the right sign for all
the dummies of segment, which are expected to be negative (the greater the cost of
entry, the less entry we see). Regarding the segment-specic demand parameters,
positive signs should be expected: the more protable a model is, the more likely
entry is. However, I get positive signs only in the Small-Mini, Intermediate and Sport
segments, in the alternative specications tried, even after controlling for origin
7For instance, pit is instrumented by ~pit lagged 12 months, where ~pit = pit   1Ti
TiX
t=1
pit , and Ti
is the number of time observations of good i.
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or other characteristics. The negative signs in the remaining demand parameters
contradict what is expected from the model and it is indicative of the poorness of the
rst approach8. The assumption made assigns too low a market share to entrants
and too high a share to non-entries because I am approximating failed entries with
the market share of car models which sell well. Though they have not entered in
the current period, they may have entered recently, meaning one or two periods
earlier, and so are attractive enough to gain a good stake of the market.
Results from approach 2 are summarized in Table 10. I present specications
with di¤erent combinations of controls. Among them, the preferred specication is in
Column 4 (probit 3) as it is a parsimonious representation of the structural models.
All coe¢ cients have the expected sign and are robust to alternative specications.
The probability of entry increases in variable prots and it is decreasing in xed cost.
The demand parameters show which segments are more worth ghting for in terms
of variable prots: @
@S
(p  c) = @
@S
 


 1
1 S

= 

1
(1 S)2 > 0 and
@
@S

1
(1 S)2

=
2
(1 S)3 > 1. This means that the gross mark-up is increasing and convex in market
share, which makes sense because price elasticity is decreasing in market share9 (this
is a consequence of the logit assumption). Moreover, the gross markup is decreasing
in the marginal utility of income (price elasticity increases in ). The higher the 
is, the higher the increase in prots is when the market share goes up. The increase
is even higher when the market share is higher.  is a measure of the degree of
heterogeneity or dispersion (the variance of  is proportional to ) .This means that
the less substitutable the products are, the higher the markup can be. The most
interesting segments are those which simultaneously have a high market share and
high 

. This happens with some of the Intermediate and the Small segments. The
8That is why I omit the presentation of results.
9Price elasticity is: " = @S@p
p
S =
1
S (1  S) pS = 1 (1  S) p . Then: @@S [ 1 (1  S) p] =
1
p ( 1) < 0 .
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high coe¢ cient of minivans and sports cars is misleading because of the small market
share they represent (particularly the sports cars). For a given market share, the
smallest probability of entry would correspond to the Small and Compact segments.
However, the fact that these are the most popular segments (with more than 30%
of the total market each, see table 11) puts them among the most protable.
I use the estimated model (probit 3) to simulate the average realized prots
of operating in the Spanish market per year and segment (Figure 5). These do not
pretend to be accurate estimations of real prots; the only important thing here is the
ordering of segments in terms of protability. The High Intermediate segment seems
to be more protable over time (always rst or second in the ranking of protability).
It is also second in the ranking of the number of entries. The Small and Compact
segments also present a stable pattern of protability. They record high levels of
entry although they are slightly above average in protability. Minivans steadily
increase their popularity (share) and protability. The Intermediate segment su¤ers
dramatic changes in popularity and protability: initially, it is fairly popular and
registers a good number of entries. After 1993, it becomes unpopular and there are
almost no new models added, which corresponds to the low levels of protability
shown. But at the end of the sample, it recovers some strength and becomes by far
the most protable segment.
In summary, it is possible to distinguish two types of segments: those which
are stable and which most rms wish to be present in (Small, Compact, High In-
termediate) and other segments with an irregular performance and more subject
to short-run trends or fashion aspects (Small-Mini, Intermediate). The popularity
of these segments may be linked to rmsproduct di¤erentiation and proliferation
strategies. However, the single-product assumption rules out the consideration of
this possibility in this model, because rms are forced to ignore the e¤ects of a new
entry on their own products. As a result, there may be a biased incentive for entry
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with respect to the case of multi-product rms.
The better opportunities for entry are in segments with good protability, but the
stability of prots is also important. That is why most of the entrants go to segments
of the rst type. The most representative fact supporting this conclusion is that the
segment with the highest number of entries is the Compact (which represents 32%
of the market, second right after the Small segment) (see Table 12 and Table 11),
although it is fth in the ranking of estimated prots (Figure 5). Nevertheless,
the static nature of the model, which forces the recovery of entry costs in the next
period, may be biasing the results. Part of the gap between observed entry rates and
estimated protability may be due to the fact that a static model would require small
xed costs many times in order to accommodate real entry rates. The probability
of having those small xed costs would be very small. In practice, the static model
would only be consistent with lower rates of entry and lower protability even if
in reality we observe higher entry rates. However, this bias would be a¤ecting
all segments such that relative positions should not be a¤ected much. As such, the
result can still provide some insights into decisions of entry: rms prefer to introduce
their products where it is safer to recover costs. They would prefer segments where
there is some certainty about future prots, rather than segments where prots vary
greatly.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter studies the determinants of product entry decisions in the Spanish car
market. There are several reasons behind the decision to introduce new products,
such as replacement of old goods, proliferation, or strategic reaction to competitors
actions. It is common to observe rms regularly introducing new products. Some-
times entries take place in a massive way and on other occasions they are rather
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sparse. Here we propose a two-stage, static model of entry and price competition
among single-product rms. The rationale for entry is that expected prots are
higher than xed costs. The model is estimated using data on entries and char-
acteristics for the Spanish car industry in the period 1990-2000. As the products
which do not enter are not observed in the sample, it is necessary to simulate their
market share before running the estimation. By doing so, the positive relation be-
tween entry and variable prots and the negative relation with xed cost of entry are
conrmed. Moreover, the chapter shows how the phenomenon of entry is associated
with the perspectives of protability in each segment. In the model, segments with
the higher rates of entry need not always be the most protable. Prots are the
main driving force of entry but the existence of a stable demand or market share for
the model is also a key factor.
These results have to be considered with caution. The static nature of the model
may introduce a bias in the relation between entry and protability. Moreover,
the single-product assumption excludes any consideration of product proliferation
strategies, which is a relevant factor to explain entry decisions. For this reason, the
next chapter will focus on building up a dynamic oligopoly model of competition
among multiproduct rms, taking into explicit consideration the possibility of the
existence of product proliferation incentives from the rmscost side. The aim will
be to overcome these caveats and provide further insights into the determinants of
product introduction decisions.
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Graphics and Tables
Table 1: Tari¤s on imported cars
Spain Tari¤s on cars from: 1990 1991 1992 1993 onwards
EU 12.4 8.3 4.1 0
Non-EU 23.6 18.7 13.8 10.3
EU Tari¤s on cars from: 1990 1991 1992 1993 onwards
EU 0 0 0 0
Non-EU 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3
Table 2: Gross number of entries and exits by year
YEAR STOCK GROSS ENTRIES GROSS EXITS
1990 77 20 2
1991 95 10 5
1992 100 16 10
1993 106 11 8
1994 109 13 12
1995 110 17 11
1996 116 18 13
1997 121 29 10
1998 140 19 10
1999 149 11 7
2000 153 16 10
2001 159 - -
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Table 3: Entries and exits by rm
Brand Initial numberof models
Entries in
jan-1990
Initial number
of segments
Initial
segments
Final number
of models
Final number
of segments
Final
segments
Total number
of entries
Total
number
of exits
Net balance
of entries-exits
Alfa Romeo 3 - 3 (3,4,6) 4 3 (3,5,6) 5 4 1
Audi 3 - 3 (4,5,7) 6 5 (2,3,5,6,7) 7 4 3
BMW 7 1 (BMW 535) 2 (5,6) 10 3 (5,6,7) 5 2 3
Chrysler 0 - 0 - 6 4 (3,5,6,8) 7 1 6
Citroen 3 - 3 (2,4,6) 4 4 (2,4,5,8) 5 4 1
Daewoo 0 - 0 - 6 5 (2,3,4,5,8) 8 2 6
Fiat 4 1 (Panda) 3 (2,3,4) 8 6 (1,2,3,4,7,8) 12 8 4
Ford 5 - 5 (2,3,4,5,6) 8 6 (1,2,3,5,7,8) 8 5 3
Galloper 0 - 0 - 1 1 (8) 1 0 1
Honda 1 - 1 (5) 4 3 (2,3,5) 4 1 3
Hyundai 0 - 0 - 7 6 (2,3,5,6,7,8) 9 2 7
Jaguar 1 - 1 (7) 1 1 (7) 0 0 0
Kia 0 - 0 - 7 3 (3,5,8) 8 1 7
Lada 1 - 1 (2) 0 0 - 0 1 -1
Lancia 3 1 (Dedra) 3 (1,3,4) 3 3 (2,5,6) 4 4 0
Mazda 2 - 2 (3,5) 5 5 (2,3,5,7,8) 4 1 3
Mercedes Benz 4 1 (S-300) 2 (5,6) 12 4 (5,6,7,8) 9 1 8
Mitsubishi 0 1 (Galant) 0 - 3 3 (3,4,8) 3 0 3
Nissan 2 - 2 (3,4) 6 5 (2,3,5,6,8) 8 4 4
Opel 5 - 4 (2,3,5,6) 7 6 (2,3,5,6,7,8) 7 5 2
Peugeot 5 - 5 (2,3,4,5,6) 6 5 (2,3,5,6,8) 6 5 1
Porsche 1 - 1 (7) 1 1 (7) 0 0 0
Renault 6 - 5 (2,3,5,6,8) 6 6 (1,2,3,5,6,8) 5 5 0
Rover 4 - 4 (1,3,4,6) 3 3 (3,4,5) 13 14 -1
Saab 2 - 2 (5,6) 2 2 (5,6) 2 2 0
Seat 3 - 3 (1,2,3) 6 5 (1,2,3,4,8) 5 2 3
Skoda 1 - 1 (2) 3 3 (2,3,4) 5 3 2
Subaru 0 - 0 - 1 1 (6) 1 0 1
Suzuki 0 1 (Swift) 0 - 3 3 (2,3,8) 5 2 3
Toyota 3 1 (Corolla) 2 (6,7) 6 4 (2,5,7,8) 7 4 3
Volkswagen 6 - 5 (2,3,4,5,7) 7 6 (1,2,3,4,5,8) 5 4 1
Volvo 1
2 (Volvo 440,
    Volvo 740)
1 (3) 7 3 (5,6,7) 12 6 6
Yugo 1 - 1 (2) 0 0 - 0 1 -1
TOTALS 77 9 159 180 98 82
Segment codes: Small-M in i (1), Small (2), Compact (3), Interm ediate (4), H igh Interm ediate (5), Luxury (6), Sp ort (7), M in ivan (8)
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Table 6: Denition of characteristics and units of measure
Characteristic Unit of measure
Cubic Centimeters Itself
Weight Kilograms
Cubic Centimeters per Kg. cc/kg
Length Centimeters
Width Centimeters
Car Size Length * Width measured in square meters
Maximum Speed Km/hour
Fuel Consumption Litres/100 Km.
Price 1000's €
Real Price Computed using the spanish consumption price index IPC
Air Conditioning Dummy =1 if the car has the characteristic
ABS Dummy =1 if the car has the characteristic
Registrations In units
Market Size Number of households, in 1000's
Table 7: Some examples of models included in di¤erent segments
Segment Example
Small-Mini Ford Ka, Fiat Cinquecento, Renault Twingo, Seat Arousa
Small
Citroen AX, Lada Samara, Opel Corsa, Peugeot 205, Yugo, Fiat Uno,
Ford Fiesta, Seat Ibiza, Volkswagen Polo, Nissan Micra, Rover 114,
Skoda Felicia, Daewoo Matiz, Hyundai Atos, Kia Pride
Compact
Audi A3, Rover 146, Rover 218, Citroen ZX, Fiat Bravo, Daewoo Lanos,
Ford Focus, Honda Civic, Hyundai Accent, Opel Astra, Lancia Delta,
Renault Megane, Seat Cordoba, Volkswagen Golf, Kia Rio
Intermediate
Citroen BX, Daewoo Nubira, Ford Orion, Rover Montego, Rover 418,
Seat Toledo, Seat Leon, Volkswagen Bora, Volvo 440
High Intermediate
Audi A4, Citroen Xantia, Chrysler Neon, Daewoo Leganza,
Ford Mondeo, Honda Accord, Hyundai Lantra, Mercedes C180,
Nissan Primera, Opel Vectra, Peugeot 406, Renault Laguna,
Toyota Corolla, Volkswagen Passat, Volvo S60, Kia Clarus
Luxury
Audi A6, BMW 535, Chrysler Stratus, Hyundai Sonata, Mercedes E400,
Opel Omega, Renault Safrane, Saab 9000, Volvo S80
Sport
Audi TT, BMW Z3, Ford Cougar, Hyundai Coupe, Jaguar XJ,
Mercedes SLK, Porsche 911, Opel Calibra, Toyota Celica,
Minivan
Citroen Evasion, Chrysler Voyager, Daewoo Tacuma, Fiat Multipla,
Ford Galaxy, Mercedes A140, Nissan Serena, Peugeot 806,
Renault Space, Seat Alhambra, Volkswagen Sharan, Kia Carens
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Table 8: Summary of selected descriptive probit specications
Dependent variable: Specification 1 Specification 2
Enter Marginal Effects(Standard error)
Marginal Effects
(Standard error)
Average Real Price (Thousand €)
0,003525*
(0,001284)
0,0035398*
(0,0012943)
Number of models
0,0719273*
(0,0135305)
0,0722675*
(0,0137404)
Age of brand's oldest model
-0,001453*
(0,0002173)
-0,0014543*
(0,0002182)
Ratio of entries to stock of models
0,956466*
(0,1060087)
0,9504794*
(0,1069682)
Segment share
0,2448921*
(0,0677175)
0,2442937*
(0,0680388)
European brand
0,0251597
(0,0169188)
0,0258207
(0,0164597)
Non-European brand
0,0419659***
(0,0235581)
0,0335443
(0,0299674)
Tariffs -
0,0009161
(0,0016577)
obs.  P
pred. P
0,1581395
0,1135579
0,1581395
0,1134792
# obs. 1075 1075
wald Chi-2
(Df)
191,63
(7)
195,41
(8)
Prob>Chi-2 0 0
*, **, *** means significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively
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Table 9: Demand Estimation (Random E¤ects)
Dependent Variable:
Market share Coefficient Standard Error
Characteristics:
Cubic Cent./Kg. 0,3261633 * 0,0878
Car Size (Length x Width) 0,2827675 * 0,0437
Km. With 1 L. Of fuel 0,0425874 * 0,0081
Maximum Speed 0,0010 0,0020
Age in years  -0,1931445 * 0,0196
Age squared 0,0040193 * 0,0003
Air Conditioning 0,095326 * 0,0361
ABS 0,3625136 * 0,0319
Real price coefficients:
Small-Mini  -0,3630397 ** 0,1539
Small  0,3165384 * 0,0634
Compact  -0,1432025 ** 0,0615
Intermediate  -0,0989246 *** 0,0547
High Intermediate  -0,1810073 * 0,0280
Luxury -0,0215 0,0147
Sport  -0,1881806 * 0,0415
Minivan  -0,107112 ** 0,0514
Constant  -12,49829 * 1,3802
Segment Dummies Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Brand Dummies Yes
# Obs 12488
sigma eta
(St. Dev. of the unobserved component)
2,1820
sigma e
(St. Dev. of the error term)
0,7350
rho
(Fraction of variance due to eta)
0,8981
 *, **, *** mean significance at 1%,5%,
and 10%, respectively
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Table 10: Selected structural probit estimations
Structural Probits: Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5
Dependent Variable: Probability of entry
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Price coefficients:
Small-Mini 1,7917 1,5577 2,2224 1,8495 2,0581
(0,8748) (0,8915) (0,8974) (0,8773) (0,9193)
Small 0,5492 0,4228 0,6711 0,5550 0,5580
(0,1563) (0,1624) (0,1609) (0,1566) (0,1678)
Compact 0,4116 0,4439 0,4965 0,4034 0,5393
(0,1463) (0,1495) (0,1488) (0,1465) (0,1528)
Intermediate 1,5418 1,5015 1,8272 1,5483 1,8300
(0,3790) (0,3813) (0,3913) (0,3814) (0,3971)
High Intermediate 1,3782 1,6037 1,7765 1,3390 2,0551
(0,7686) (0,7824) (0,7907) (0,7665) (0,8090)
Luxury 2,0186 1,9802 2,2432 1,9364 2,1791
(0,7142) (0,7735) (0,7331) (0,7165) (0,7985)
Sport 2,7105 2,3557 3,0120 2,6710 2,6181
(0,8442) (0,8570) (0,8683) (0,8466) (0,8900)
Minivan 4,3890 4,4483 4,8958 4,3716 4,9553
(2,0361) (2,0480) (2,0967) (2,0402) (2,1174)
Fixed Costs:
Small-Mini -0,5066 -0,2922 -0,6919 -0,5549 -0,5270
(0,5116) (0,5216) (0,5235) (0,5144) (0,5352)
Small -0,4776 -0,3516 -0,5799 -0,5100 -0,4926
(0,3246) (0,3292) (0,3344) (0,3262) (0,3403)
Compact -0,2859 -0,3347 -0,3719 -0,3062 -0,4631
(0,3018) (0,3064) (0,3081) (0,3025) (0,3134)
Intermediate -0,5850 -0,5039 -0,7307 -0,6248 -0,7046
(0,3446) (0,3494) (0,3547) (0,3469) (0,3607)
High Intermediate -0,3966 -0,4330 -0,5154 -0,4161 -0,6042
(0,3131) (0,3167) (0,3212) (0,3137) (0,3264)
Luxury -0,6894 -0,8474 -0,8037 -0,7023 -1,0101
(0,3378) (0,3541) (0,3464) (0,3381) (0,3652)
Sport -0,5675 -0,3880 -0,6442 -0,5832 -0,4841
(0,3284) (0,3323) (0,3356) (0,3289) (0,3401)
Constant (Minivan) -1,6452 -2,1484 -1,1629 -1,6494 -1,5888
(0,3041) (0,3201) (0,3491) (0,3043) (0,3607)
Controls:
European 0,9479 0,7015 1,0434 0,9417 0,7867
(0,1615) (0,1720) (0,1665) (0,1615) (0,1774)
Non-European 1,0264 1,0365 1,1527 1,0284 1,1904
(0,1608) (0,1652) (0,1665) (0,1609) (0,1724)
Number of Models - 0,3973 - - 0,4406
(0,0642) (0,0669)
Dummy for the Existence of Tariffs - - - 0,1328 -
(0,1169)
Dummies for Year No No Yes No Yes
# Obs. 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075
L.R. Statistic
(D.f.)
80,41
(17)
118,74
(18)
113,81
(27)
81,69
(18)
157,61
(28)
Pseudo R2 0,0857 0,1265 0,1213 0,087 0,1679
Note: price coe¢ cients are estimates of the ratio 

.
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Chapter 4
Entry Costs and Economies of Scope in
Multiproduct FirmsMarket Decisions: The
Case of the Spanish Automobile Industry
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the costs of product introduction and commercialization in
di¤erentiated product markets from a dynamic point of view, with an application
to the Spanish automobile industry in the 1990s. This market displays signicant
rates of entry and exit during that decade and is characterized by the existence of
multiproduct rms that compete segment by segment with, usually, one model per
segment.
Car producers are mostly multinational rms making decisions at the global
industry level, namely, the development of new products. However, one thing is
the R&D e¤ort made to expand or improve the range of products and another
is to choose the precise moment to implement those improvements. The decision
to develop new products is made at the global level but the decision to introduce
new products in Spain is made at the Spanish level. Even though the concept
of region for a multinational rm may exceed the boundaries of a country, the
empirical evidence shows that signicant di¤erences arise in the entry and exit of
identical products across markets1. The intuition is that, apart from the R&D
1See chapter 2.
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costs, the e¤ective implementation of a new product depends on market-specic
factors, namely on the commercialization side. Demand conditions, regional or
national tastes for characteristics, etc. can render a product successful in one given
market while it fails in another. In this chapter, I argue that incumbent rms
have advantages in commercialization that make it easier for them to introduce new
products compared to entrant rms. In particular, I look at the advantages when
expanding the range of products: the conjecture is that a rm nds it easier to
introduce a new variety of product (say a car in a new segment) when it already has
other types of cars. The results give support to that claim and serve also to explain
product proliferation in the industry.
Panzar and Willig coined the term economies of scopeto describe cost savings
that arise when the production of two or more product lines is combined, instead
of being produced by separate rms (Panzar and Willig (1981)). Since then, many
papers have been devoted to the measurement of economies of scope in di¤erent
economic sectors like banking or hospitals. These approaches are based on the es-
timation of cost functions for multiproduct rms. However, they have a productive
perspective in the sense they care only about cost savings from joint production,
neglecting the costs of introducing those products. In industries like the auto in-
dustry, where the development and e¤ective introduction of new products involves
large costs in engineering, production, marketing, commercialization, and distribu-
tion, the omission of entry costs can give rise to misleading conclusions. For example,
imagine two products whose joint production implies cost savings but only the rst
one exists and the second can only reach the market if large sunk costs in R&D or
advertising are made. In that case, any productive advantage may be overwhelmed
by entry costs.
In this chapter, I look at the economies of scope of product introduction ab-
stracting from other scope economies. The model does not intend to explain scope
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economies in R&D, production, or plant activity. It intends to quantify the com-
mercial advantage that a rm gets after it enters a market for the rst time as the
di¤erence between the entry costs of subsequent products. I consider only economies
of scope within the rm, i.e., product entry by a rms competitors may have mar-
ket enlargement and business stealing e¤ects, but this is not supposed to a¤ect a
rms entry costs. The commercial advantage may reect brand image, continued
advertising, development of dealer networks, etc. The separation between economies
of scope in production and commercialization can be made because, as mentioned
above, there is evidence about non-simultaneous or sequential entry of new products
across countries. This suggests that development and entry are separate stages of
the game played by car manufacturers and that it is not because a rm is faster
or better in R&D that it introduces a new model earlier in one market relative
to other markets. It serves also to avoid economies of scope in production being
captured by the measure of economies of scope in commercialization because each
of them belong to a di¤erent stage.
In this way we can talk of scope economies in the commercialization of new
products and give a measure of their importance, which is the main contribution of
the paper.
Contrary to standard productive costs functions, entry costs have the special
characteristic that they are paid only once, but their e¤ects spread over future pe-
riods. Therefore, they must be treated di¤erently from usual recurrent costs. For
this purpose, and relying on the strand of literature starting from Ericson and Pakes
(1995), I construct a model where multiproduct rms decide whether to introduce
and quit products and potential entrant rms decide on entry. Product is di¤erenti-
ated in quality, which is allowed to exogenously vary over time at some cost. Product
characteristics are summarized in a quality index representing the utility obtained
by consumers. Finally, there is price competition. Firms play a game that lasts a
Chapter 4: Entry Costs and Economies of Scope 73
(perhaps innite) number of periods, di¤ering from the classical supergames in
that it is a single game, rather than the innite replica of a multi-stage game.
The decisions of entry/exit and also the changes in quality have dynamic implica-
tions because they a¤ect not only current payo¤s but also future payo¤s and actions.
Therefore, they must be treated di¤erently from static decisions, whose inuence is
limited only to the period in which they are made, with no further repercussion. In
my model, pricing is a static decision.
In the literature, there already are alternative methodologies dealing with the
estimation of dynamic models. However, there are just a few empirical works on the
topic that either focus on homogeneous product markets or go into a limited degree
of di¤erentiation. Compared to these works, the multi-product perspective of this
paper calls for a clear distinction between rm entry cost and product introduction
cost in the modeling strategy.
The structure of the paper is the following: in the next section I review the
literature on entry and dynamic models. Then I present the model. In Section 4
I detail the estimation strategy. Section 5 describes the database used. Section 6
presents the results and further details. I conclude in Section 7.
4.2 Literature Review
The topic of entry and exit in automobile markets has been addressed from di¤erent
perspectives. For example, Geroski and Murn (1991) examine entry patterns across
three segments of the U.K. car industry. They develop a probit model of the entry
decision where post-entry prots depend on post-entry advertising shares. They nd
evidence that prior experience in the market may have had a small e¤ect on entry
in a particular segment. Geroski and Mazzucato (2001) study the relation between
entry and advertising in the US automobile market. Requena-Silvente and Walker
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(2005) study how model survival in the UK car market relates to competition. They
nd that inter-rm competition determines survival of sports and luxury models
while intra-rm competition is determinant for the rest. However, these works are
based on the estimation of reduced form models, a usual characteristic in the earlier
papers in this literature. Regarding the Spanish market, the focus has been on
testing pricing behavior (Jaumandreu and Moral (2006)) or on the role of advertising
(Barroso (2007)).
The rst structural works of entry proposed multi-stage game theory models (see
Toivanen and Waterson (2000) for a review). However, static models are not able
to capture the intrinsic dynamic nature of entry costs. The framework proposed
by Ericson and Pakes (1995) and recently revised by Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2007) has become the standard way to model dynamic oligopolies. I follow their
approach in building up my model. Nevertheless, the large computational costs in
solving for an equilibrium of those models has limited the range of empirical ap-
plications. Recent methodological developments (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007);
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007); Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007); Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2007)), which make it possible to estimate the structural dy-
namic parameters without solving for an equilibrium, have boosted the literature on
applied dynamic oligopoly models. The topics covered include rm entry and exit
in homogeneous good markets (Ryan (2006); Collard-Wexler (2006)), entry in geo-
graphic markets (Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu (2006)), entry and competition
in local retail markets (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)), and horizontal location of
rms (Sweeting (2007)). So far, there has been no previous attempt to estimate
product introduction costs by multiproduct rms, and the applications to the auto-
mobile industry focus only on the relation between market structure and innovation
(Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck (2007)). To the best of my knowledge, the concept of
scope economies dened in Panzar and Willig (1981) has not been used to provide
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a rationale for rmsproduct introduction and product proliferation strategies.
4.3 The Model
The ith rm maximizes the discounted sum of expected prots from the sum of its
Nit products (indexed by j ); Nt is the total number of products at t:
i = E
1X
t=0
NitX
j
tijt ; 8 i = 1; :::; Nt (1)
A common discount factor  is assumed for all rms. Variable prots are given by:
varijt = (pijt   cijt)Dijt (Pt; Kt)
Individual demand depends on the vector of all competing product prices and
characteristics:
Pt = (p1t; :::; pNtt)
Kt = (k1t; :::kNtt)
kijt is a quality index summarizing product characteristics (excluding price). I do not
consider the problem of choosing characteristics in a multidimensional framework,
hence each product is just a bundle of diverse features added up using a hedonic
weight, q , for each one:
ki = 1ki1 + 2ki2 + :::+ qkiq (2)
I assume that products are exogenously classied in segments (groups). Then
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following Berry (1994), demand is modeled using a standard nested logit model:
Dit (Pt; Kt) = Sit (Pt; Kt) Mt
Sijt =
exp

kijt pijt
1 

P
j2Gg
exp

kijt pijt
1 

" P
j2Gg
exp

kijt pijt
1 
#1 
1 +
GP
g=1
" P
j2Gg
exp

kijt pijt
1 
#1 
where Mt is the market size and Sijt () is the share of product j. I also assume a
constant marginal cost of production, cijt.
There is a product specic cost2, F (kijt; iijt), of implementing a quality index
kijt with quality change iijt .
4.3.1 State Variables and Controls
I describe here the state space of the model. I try to represent it in a parsimonious
way, although this requires making some simplications. I comment on them as I
describe each element of the state space.
In period t , the controls are the decisions of entry and exit
 
ijt

and the decision
of whether to invest. Entry and exit determine the number of products at the
beginning of t+1. Therefore, N is an endogenously evolving state variable. However,
market shares do not depend directly on the number of products. The larger the
number of competitors, the less likely a particular product is consumed because
there are more potential options that can give more utility. Thus, Nt inuences
2The cost of change is just the cost of adapting the product to the new specication (and not
the cost of developing it), e.g., the cost of adapting the car to embody a more powerful engine,
or perhaps the cost of adapting the productive chain of that model. It is true that in order to
use a more powerful engine, it must rst be designed and developed. In this stage, spillovers arise
within multiproduct rms, which can make it easier to develop new engines for other models.
These are the scope economies in production (or R&D), but I am looking only to scope economies
in commercialization.
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shares through the pair (Kt; Pt)3. An alternative way of considering the number of
competitors would be to split N into its components: number of products in the
segment and number of products in other segments. The former may capture the
incentives for product exit in a segment as a consequence of competition. The latter
could reect the incentives for product entry in new segments to relax competition.
The total number of rms is xed and known. They may be incumbents or
potential entrants. Candidate products not introduced are discarded and in the
following period a new set of products will be available for entry. There is an
implicit but important assumption, which is that every period the feasible set of
products for a rm is somehow given. The decisions of entry are made on these
products. This rst stage where products become available is not modelled. This
caveat is partially justied in the application I have in mind: product entry in a
national market by a global rm, where R&D is made at the global level, so that
every period a range of products becomes available worldwide but the decision of
entry is made independently in each national market. Needless to say, the ideal
model should account for that stage as well.
Initial quality is given by initial product characteristics, which are drawn from
some distribution and then aggregated to form the index, whose initial value is
thus random. Given that I am not modelling the choice of characteristics and I
only need the quality index, it is in fact simpler to assume randomly drawn initial
quality, understanding that it is linked to characteristics through equation (2). Firms
modify quality as time goes by. The amount of change, if any, is exogenously given.
The model does not deal with choice of characteristics and, as noted above, when
they vary I assume they do it in exogenous amounts. However, the decision of
modication is endogenous because the rm can always keep the product as is
3In my model, we can only have a direct e¤ect of the number of incumbents over market shares
when all rms o¤er the same pair (k; p) , then: Sijt =
expfk pg
1 Nexpfk pg .
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without modications. Therefore, the model can explain entry and exit decisions
controlling for the empirical fact that quality is changing over time. In the context of
product di¤erentiation, it is necessary to keep track of product characteristics even
though we are only interested in the entry-exit process, because characteristics dene
products. Notice that quality changes are an alternative to product replacement,
but if the cost of those changes is too high, rms may prefer to quit the product.
The dimension of K becomes large as the number of products increases and this
poses a problem in estimation because the state space is too large. Therefore, I
consider an alternative representation of the state space in the spirit of Weintraub,
Benkard, and Van Roy (2007), where for each product the state is dened by its
quality index, the average quality index K, and the number of competing products.
Likewise, I do not include market size or demand conditions in the state space.
4.3.2 Timing
Each rm receives a private draw from the distribution of sunk costs of entry/sell-o¤
values (depending on whether it is an entrant or an incumbent) and decides ijt.
If a rm does not quit the product, it receives an exogenous shock that determines
whether the quality of the good is going to be changed or not. Entrants can immedi-
ately start to sell their product; exiting rms receive their scrap value and disappear.
Given the new (Kt; Nt), rms simultaneously set prices and receive variable prots.
The important thing here is that rms cannot change kijt or ijt when they are
about to compete in prices. Shocks happen before decisions are made and are the
key to rationalizing the variability of decisions from rms with the same observed
features.
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4.3.3 Decision Rules
Firms make several decisions every period. An incumbent rm decides, for each
segment, whether to introduce a new product or not. If it has no product in a
segment, that decision is equivalent to entering or not entering that segment. If
it already has other product(s) in the segment, then it can decide whether to quit
any of them. Firms that are out of the market may decide to enter or not. Entry
may take place in more than one segment at the same time. Firms are allowed to
introduce at most one new product per segment and period, but they can quit as
many products as they have. There is a maximum for the number of products a
rm can commercialize in each segment. Enter/Not enter decisions are represented
by the indicator eijt = f0; 1g and stay/exit by ijt = f0; 1g. After all rms have
decided about entry and exit, products are modied if necessary. Finally, there is
price competition.
Entry/Stay/Exit Every period each incumbent (entrant) receives a shock from a
known distribution on the sell-o¤ value (sunk cost of entry),  (). If the discounted
sum of expected payo¤s is smaller than that draw, the rm exits (does not enter),
i.e.:
ijt = 0() EDV incumbentt (Kt 1; Nt 1)  
eijt = 0() EDV entrantt (Kt 1; Nt 1)  
whereEDV incumbentt (Kt 1; Nt 1) andEDV
entrant
t (Kt 1; Nt 1) represent the expected
discounted sum of payo¤s for an incumbent and an entrant, respectively, conditional
on staying/entering at t given (Kt 1; Nt 1). I assume that when a rm quits a prod-
uct, it can never re-enter. Instead, it may introduce a new product. Also, all rms
decide ijt simultaneously. These are dynamic decisions because their e¤ects spread
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over a number of periods.
Pricing This is a static decision: pijt+s is not a function of pijt+1 8 s 6= 1. Pric-
ing decisions become determined by the state variables and Bertrand competition.
Therefore, prices are irrelevant in the dynamic problem and they can be substituted
by their optimal expressions in the one-period payo¤ function.
Given kijt and Nt, pijt is chosen so as to maximize the prot stage. As I argued
above, this is a self-containeddecision and I can substitute back in the one-period
payo¤ function to obtain a reduced form:
it = it (Kt; Nt)
It can be shown that the rst-order condition of a multiproduct rm in a nested
logit is:
(pj   cj)Sj = 1  

Sj + Sj=g
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj
+(1  )Sj
X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj ;8j;8g
From this system of FOCs, it is possible to obtain an equilibrium expression of
product variable prot as a function of the state variables:
varj (Kt; Nt) =
1  

Sj (Kt)M + Sj=g (Kt)
var
ig (Kt; Nt)
+ (1  )Sj (Kt)vari (Kt; Nt) ;8j;8g
where  is the marginal utility of income,  is the degree of intra-group correlation
and Sj=g is the market share of j conditioned to group g. varig is the variable prot
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of rm i in segment g, and vari is the total prot of rm i:
varig =
(1  )
X
j2Gg
Sj
1  
X
j2Gg
Sj=g

M

+ vari

;8g
vari =
M
X
g2Gg
1

(1 )
X
j2Gg
Sj
1 
X
j2Gg
Sj=g
1 
X
g2G
(1 )
X
j2Gg
Sj
1 
X
j2Gg
Sj=g
Notice that there is an implicit, non-linear, one-to-one relationship between p
and k. p is determined with no direct inuence of the shock ", although p is a¤ected
by " through k.
Characteristics As discussed above, rms modify product characteristics in re-
sponse to exogenous changes. When this happens, rms adjust product quality to
a new level such that:
iijt = kijt   kijt 1
iijt can be interpreted as the change of value of product j in hedonic terms. This
is a deterministic law of motion for kijt; what is random is the decision to change
product specication.
Summarizing, the one-period payo¤ function is given by:
it =
NitX
j=1
ijt [(pijt   cijt)SijtMt + 1 (iijt 6= 0) (F (kijt; iijt) + "ijt)]
 eijteijt +
 
1  ijt

ijt (3)
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where 1 (inv 6= 0) is an indicator function whose value is zero if investment is zero,
and one otherwise. Notice that e = 1 =)  = 1 and  = 0 =) e = 0. A model
that is in the market and continues is represented by  = 1; e = 0 . e = 1;  = 0
is not possible.
The prot from a product continuing in the market is:
ijt
 
Kt; N
I
t

= varj (Kt; Nt) + 1 (inv 6= 0) (F (kijt; iijt) + "ijt) (4)
ijt depends on Kt in a highly non-linear way through market shares.
4.3.4 Bellman Equation
The Bellman equation of the problem can be written as:
 For an incumbent:
Vij (Kt 1; Nt 1) = max
8><>:ijt ; maxiijt
8><>: ijt + 
R
Vij (Kt; Nt)
dGK (KtjKt 1) dGN (NtjNt 1)
9>=>;
9>=>;
and it is given by (4).
 For a potential entrant:
Vij (Kt 1; Nt 1) = max
8><>:0 ; maxiijt
8><>:  ijt + ijt + 
R
Vij (Kt; Nt)
dGK (KtjKt 1) dGN (NtjNt 1)
9>=>;
9>=>;
and ijt is given by (4). Notice that the entrant incurs the cost ijt right after
entry, and it can immediately start to sell the product.
GK and GN are the distribution functions giving the transition probabilities of
K and N , respectively.
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4.3.5 Equilibrium Concept
Firms make decisions with an innite horizon and so the potential number of Nash
equilibria (NE) is likely to be large, involving complex combinations of decision
rules. Therefore, I consider a restricted class of NE, the pure strategy Markov
perfect equilibria (MPE), by assuming rms play Markov strategies, which means
that strategies depend on all payo¤ relevant history. Formally, a Markov strategy is
a map from the state space to the action space:
ijt : Kt Nt  ! Aijt
such that:
ijt (Kt 1Nt 1; Kt 2; Nt 2; Kt 3; Nt 3; :::) = ijt (Kt 1; Nt 1)
Lets dene a prole of Markov strategies as the vector:
t = (1t; :::; Ntt)
Following Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2005), we can say that a Markov
strategy prole, , is an MPE if for all ij, all states, and all Markov strategies, 0ij:
Vij (K;N j ij;  ij)  Vij
 
K;N j 0ij;  ij

Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007) (DS) show the existence of (at least one) MPE
in an Ericson and Pakes (1995) setting like mine. In particular, proposition 1 in
DS shows that an MPE equilibrium exists in cuto¤ entry-exit and pure invest-
ment strategies under three assumptions. Assumption 1 states boundness of the
models primitives (nite state space, bounded prots and investment, continuity
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and bounded support of entry costs and scrap values, and discounting). Assumption
2 is basically a continuity assumption in payo¤ functions. Assumption 3 requires
that a rms investment choice is always uniquely determined. The rst two are
standard assumptions easy to verify. The third one is a bit more restrictive, but
not a big issue in my model. I consider exogenously determined investment with
one unique investment level for each state and this is optimal provided the policy
function has been accurately recovered.
I assume that if there is more than one equilibrium, then the data is generated
from only one of them.
Therefore, the value function can be written in recursive form:
Vij (K;N j) = ij ( (K;N) ; K;N)
+
Z
Vij (K
0; N 0j) dGK (K 0j (K;N) ; K) dGN (N 0j (K;N) ; N)
4.4 Estimation Strategy
In this section, I follow the two-step methodology developed in Bajari, Benkard, and
Levin (2007) (BBL). In the rst step, the goal is to estimate policy functions and all
parameters not involved in the dynamics of the problem. These allow the simulation
of alternative histories for the industry which are then used in the second step to
recover the dynamic parameters and value function estimates in equilibrium.
4.4.1 First Stage
The target parameters here are those from market demand, variable prot function,
investment, and entry/stay/exit decision rules.
Variable static prots are computed by making use of the equilibrium expression
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obtained from the logit specication:
varijt =
1  

SijtM + Sj=g
var
ig + (1  )Sijtvari (5)
 is the marginal utility of income, obtained from demand estimation, Mt is (ob-
served) market size, and varig and 
var
i are functions of market shares dened above.
Therefore, the key element is the estimation of market shares, which is discussed
below.
As I handle a reduced form of variable prots where marginal cost is substituted
away, I do not have to be concerned about estimating variable production costs.
The policy functions for entry and exit are kept simple (as, for example, in Ryan
(2006)). I model the probability of rm i introducing a new model j at time t in
segment g, conditional on the number of models of the rm Ni, as a function of the
number of models it has in other segments, Ni; g, and on the average quality in the
segment, Avksg. (Other measures of the number of competitors were considered,
but their coe¢ cients had signicance problems).
The dimension of the state space would require a lot of data to be able to estimate
the policy function parameters for each combination of quality for all competing
models. This is why I consider the average quality in the segment as a proxy for the
vector of product qualities. For the same reason, I consider the number of models
instead of the particular portfolio of the rms products. This is to say that, for
example, the decision of entry of the third, large model having a small and a mini
is equivalent to having a medium and a mini. The implicit assumption under these
two simplications is that I am still able to recover the optimal policies coming from
the equilibrium of the model.
Chapter 4: Entry Costs and Economies of Scope 86
Using Bayesrule:
prob (entryijtjNit) = Pr (Nitjentry)  Pr (entry)
Pr (Nitjentry)  Pr (entry) + Pr (Nitjno entry)  Pr (no entry)
where Pr (Nitjentry) and Pr (Nitjno entry) are modeled using ordered probits:
Pr (Nit = 0 j entry) = Fn (c1   1 Ni; g;t 1   2  Avksggt 1) = Fn (c1   x)
Pr (Nit = n j entry) = Fn (cn+1   x)  Fn (cn   x) ; n = 1; :::; N   1 (6)
Pr (Nit = N j entry) = 1  Fn (cN   x)
where the c0s are the cuto¤s determining when each category is chosen. The same is
done for Pr (Nitjno entry). The Pr (entry) is estimated as the sample rate of entry.
I decompose the conditional probability of entry in the reverse conditional proba-
bilities because for some N there are few observations on entry and this poses some
di¢ culties in the estimation. The Pr (Nit = n j entry) and Pr (Nit = n j no entry)
turn out to be easier to estimate and simplify the computations for the second
stage. For this reason, here I have not considered other smoothing or interpolation
techniques such as kernels or splines.
The probability of exit is modeled using a probit on the deviation of k with
respect to its segment mean (a parsimonious way of modelling the relation of product
j with its competitors), the number of models of the rm in the segment, Nig;t 1,
and the age of the rms oldest product in the segment, maxageig:
prob (exitit) = Fn (
x
0 + 3 Nig;t 1 + 4 maxageigt 1 + 5 DevkSgijt 1) (7)
The state space increases as the number of products becomes large. It is nec-
essary to reduce the dimension of the state space to be able to estimate the policy
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functions, because it is not possible to estimate one parameter for each element of
vector K. I overcome this by considering the average quality, instead of the vector
of qualities, in the entry and exit probits. Moreover, the large number of zeros in the
entry and exit decisions can pose some identication problems in those equations
unless some exclusion restriction is imposed. For this reason I add maxage as an
explicative variable in the exit equation. This variable is a proxy for the degree of
obsolescence of the product and it serves as a complement to kj (which is included
within DevkSg).
The di¤erent approach for entry and exit policies is because we are interested in
how the entry cost changes as the number of models of the rm increases. Therefore,
the entry policy must be sensitive to that fact while the exit policy can be more
parsimonious.
Quality changes are modeled in the following manner. The probability of change
depends on the current level of k and its deviation with respect to the mean of the
segment. The rm is shocked by an exogenous cuto¤ such that if the probability of
change is larger, then the quality of the product is adjusted. I use a probit for the
probability of change:
prob(invest) = Fn
 
inv0 + 6  kijt 1 + 7 DevkSgijt 1

(8)
The quality adjustment is given by a cubic B-spline policy on the deviation of
kj with respect to its segment mean:
iit = 8  Sp (DevkSgijt 1) (9)
This setup allows for a better t of the observed quality changes.
I model the adjustment cost function as an exponential of the absolute value of
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the change in characteristics, and zero when investment is zero:
F (kjt; ijt) = 1 (iijt 6= 0)  exp (abs (iijt))
I obtain the estimates for all the , , c, and  parameters. Then I can generate
a set of simulated paths from di¤erent initial conditions and confront them with
perturbed, non-optimal paths to obtain the estimates of the dynamic parameters of
the model in the second stage.
4.4.2 Second Stage
The second stage deals with the estimation of dynamic parameters (investment cost,
scrap value, entry costs). Given the actual and simulated paths for the industry, the
estimation goes as follows: recall the equilibrium condition
Vij (K;N j ij;  ij ; )  Vij
 
K;N j 0ij;  ij ; 

Recall that from equation (3), the one-period payo¤ function is linear in the dynamic
parameters and then V () is linear in :
Vij (K;N ;ij;  ij; ) = E
" 1X
t=0
t	ijt (ijt; Kt; Nt; ijt) jK0 = K;N0 = N
#
 
= Wij (K;N ;ij;  ij)   (10)
where 	ijt () =
 
varijt (K) ; F (kijt; iijt) ; ijt

is the vector of basis functions for
payo¤s and 0 = (1; ; ); then the equilibrium condition becomes:

Wij (K;N j ij;  ij ) Wij
 
K;N j 0ij;  ij
    0 (11)
Let x 2 X be an index for the equilibrium conditions such that each x represents
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a combination of product, alternative action, and states,
 
ij;K;N; 0ij

. Then each
condition (11) of the set of inequalities X can be rewritten as
g (x; ) =

Wij (K;N ;i;  i) Wij
 
K;N ;0ij;  ij
   (12)
The vector of dynamic parameters  satises an equilibrium condition dened
by x if g (x; )  0. Therefore, the estimation strategy consists in taking many such
conditions and nding a  such that protable deviations from the optimal policies
(represented by g (x; )  0) are minimized. For this purpose, dene the function
Q () =
Z
(min fg (x; ) ; 0g)2 dH (x)
where H () is a distribution over the set of inequalities, X, which the g conditions
belong to. At the true parameter value, Q (0) = 0 = min

Q (), i.e., the objective
function is minimized at 0. Its empirical counterpart can be written as:
Qn () =
1
nI
nIX
k=1
(min f~gk (x; ) ; 0g)2 (13)
where the ~g1; :::; ~gnI is a set of nI inequalities drawn from H (). ~g is the sample
counterpart of g that results from replacing Wij with simulated estimates W^ij.
Following the methodology of BBL, I randomly draw the nI inequalities to con-
struct (13). Then I compute Wi for the observed and alternative policies using ob-
served and simulated industry paths. Alternative policies are generated by adding
small, random perturbations to the policy functions. The Wijs are used to obtain
the ~gk ()s. Finally, Qn () is minimized in  for the non-positive ~gk () conditions
using standard optimization procedures. BBL show that under some regularity as-
sumptions, ^ is consistent for .
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Entry Costs Once the vector of dynamic parameters, ^, is obtained, it is possible
to estimate the distribution of sunk costs of entry in a simple manner: for each
relevant state conguration, simulate the expected discounted value of entry (EDV)
for an entrant at that state. Also compute the probability of entry using the entry
policy. We know that rms enter only if the EDV is not smaller than the sunk cost
of entry; if we match this with the predicted probability of entry, we obtain the
following relationship:
prob(entryjN) = prob (  EDV ;) = F (EDV ;)
i.e., the observed probability of entry is the value of the cumulative density function
evaluated at EDV. I assume a normal distribution for F and I minimize the squared
distance between both parts of the equation:
min
;e
1
ne
neX
i=1
[probi (entryjN)  F (EDVi)]2 (14)
where ne is the number of states for which the EDV of entry is computed. With 
and , the distribution of sunk entry costs is characterized under the assumption of
normality.
This basic procedure can be used to estimate di¤erent types of entry costs. In
particular, the model allows us to compute EDVs and entry costs for:
 Firm entry (the entrant model belongs to a rm which has no other model in
any other segment).
 Segment entry (the rm is in other segments but not in this one).
 Model entry (the rm is already in the segment and introduces a new model).
Case 1:
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This is the simplest case described above. We can compute the empirical prob-
ability of entry using the policy function, and simulate the EDV starting from an
industry conguration where this rm is not in the market.
Case 2:
In this case, the rm is already in and we want to estimate the cost of entering
another segment. The number of possible industry congurations increases with
respect to case 1 because the incumbent rm may have several models in other
segments. For example, with a classication in 8 segments and a rm that has only
one previous model, the number of alternatives with respect to case 1 multiplies by
7. If the rm already had 2 models, the number of alternatives is multiplied by 
7
2

= 21, and so on.
Again, the empirical probability can be computed and the EDVs are computed
for an industry conguration restricted in the appropriate manner.
Case 3:
The number of combinations is the same as case 1 or case 2 depending on the
particular restrictions we want to impose on the rm. In particular, we could think
of the cost of introducing the second product in the same segment and compare it
to the cost of introducing it in another segment (as in case 2).
Estimation of Entry Cost Parameters and theMeasure of Scope Economies
I argue that the entry cost is di¤erent depending on the number of models commer-
cialized by the rm. This implies that, conditional on the number of models, all
rms receive iid shocks from the same (normal) distribution over time, but this
distribution changes as the number of models changes. I introduce a parametric
restriction which is that all distributions have the same variance and they di¤er
only in the mean. This implies that those distributions are shifted to the left or
to the right as the number of models increases. Taking as a reference the entry
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cost with no previous products (rm entry), the existence of economies of scope in
commercialization follows from these distributions shifting to the left (at least for a
small number of products). Recall that the basic equation for sunk costs of entry is:
prob(entry) = FN (  EDV ;)
prob(entry) = FN

  
e
 EDV   
e

Consider for simplicity the case where we want to estimate the cost of rm entry
and the cost of introducing a second and third product in other di¤erent segments.
We can argue that they are di¤erent by factors d1 and d2 such that the mean rm
entry cost is 0, the mean entry cost of a second product is 1 = 0 + d1, and for
the third product 2 = 0 + d2. The above probability equation becomes:
prob (entry j N = 1) = FN

  d1   d2   0
e
 EDV   d1   d2   0
e

If the rm is about to introduce a third product:
prob (entry j N = 2) = FN

  d1   d2   0
e
 EDV   d1   d2   0
e

The rm entry cost can be identied from the variation in the observed rates of
entry, the normality assumption, and the variation of present discounted values. For
a given initial state, the entry policy function provides an estimate of the probability
of entry. The forward simulation procedure yields the correspondent expected value
of entry for that initial state. The quality adjustment cost parameter and the scrap
value required in the forward simulation are also identied. These parameters are
computed such that protable deviations from optimal observed behavior, summa-
rized in the policy functions, are minimized. Therefore, the variability in adjustment
decisions, conditional on the state, and their di¤erence with respect to the optimal
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ones identify the adjustment cost parameter such that the policy function is indeed
optimal. A similar argument holds for the scrap value.
The identication of ds comes from the observed variation in the number of
previous products of the rm. In practice, d should be estimated as the coe¢ cient
of a dummy for the number of rm models. For example, d2 is the coe¢ cient of the
indicator variable 1 (#models = 2). It is clear that this variable is zero in the rst
equation, but it is still good to include it because the joint estimation of 0 and ds
is more e¢ cient. The di¤erence of entry costs in other scenarios can be captured
by adding the corresponding dummy variables and computing the EDV for all the
possible states involved.
4.5 Data
I apply the methodology described above to the Spanish car industry. I use a
unique monthly data set of car models in Spain from 1990 to 2000. These data were
initially collected by, and rst used in Moral (1999)4, who also provides a thorough
description of the data base. It contains information on model characteristics such
as speed, size, consumption, and horse power, among others. I also have the number
of registrations by model and listed prices.
A descriptive look at the evolution of main characteristics (see Table 1) shows
that, on average, we observe variation in at least one characteristic in roughly 60%
of the sample of yearly observations (the ratio is obviously smaller when looking
at monthly observations). Table 2 shows the percentage of variation by segment
on a monthly basis for the same characteristics. Overall, the average variation
across segments is 4.8%. This variability is also conrmed by casual observation of
specialized press reports.
4The data base here, which runs from January 1990 to December 1996, has later been extended
up to December 2000.
Chapter 4: Entry Costs and Economies of Scope 94
Table 3 summarizes entries and exits by segment: the rate of entry is around
17% per year per 9% of exit. The persistent gap is the reason for the increasing
number of models in the industry during the 1990s.
I construct the index of characteristics of each model in the sample as a weighted
sum whose weights are the estimated coe¢ cients of each characteristic in the demand
equation (in a sense, we could call that index a gross hedonic index as price is
excluded and considered separately). The index can be interpreted as the average
utility that a consumer could obtain from that product, without taking into account
its price. Table 4 gives a summary of characteristics and prices per segment. The
coe¢ cients of the index are in Table 5.
4.6 Results and Further Details
4.6.1 First Stage Estimates
In this stage, I estimate demand and the policy functions for entry, exit, and invest-
ment.
Demand Estimation Using Nested Logit Following Berry (1994), we can write
the shares equation as follows:
ln (Sjt)  ln (S0t) = kjt   gpjt + g ln
 
Sjt=g

+ j (15)
where the marginal utility of income () and the degree of intra-group correlation
() are allowed to vary across segments. Sj=g is the market share of product j
in its group g, j is an unobserved xed e¤ect, and the index of characteristics is
constructed as:
kjt = 1Carsizejt + 2HPjt + 3KmLjt + 4ACjt + 5ABSjt
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The endogeneity of prices and conditional market shares is controlled for with
the following instruments: following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (BLP),
as instruments I use product characteristics, the sum across own-rm products of
each characteristic, and the sum across rival rmsproducts of each characteristic.
I also include the total number of models per segment (as in Brenkers and Verboven
(2006)), and nally the di¤erences of prices with respect to their individual time
means, ~pjt = pjt   1Tj
TjX
t=1
pjt, lagged 12 months (rst introduced by Bhargava and
Sargan (1983) and studied in Arellano and Bover (1995)). I also control for the
existence of tari¤s over imported cars.
Consistent estimators are obtained by rst using the within transformation to
remove the xed e¤ect and then applying two-stage least squares to the transformed
model.
Table 5 summarizes estimation results. The coe¢ cients of real price and char-
acteristics have the expected sign and almost all of them are signicant at the 1%
level.
The own-price elasticities implied by the estimates of Table 5 su¤er from the
rigidity in substitution patterns imposed by the logit assumption. The nested logit
helps in correcting the problem but the elasticities for cheaper cars are still small,
a bit far from the pattern for the US automobile industry (Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995)), but at least not so far from previous estimates for European mar-
kets (Brenkers and Verboven (2006)). In facing the trade-o¤ between accuracy and
computational simplicity, the loss of precision at this stage might not be excessively
harmful. Nested logit is still a common approach to demand estimation in auto-
mobile markets. The alternative would be to estimate demand following the BLP
methodology.
Demand estimation yields the estimate of  and  in equation (5) and the hedonic
coe¢ cients for characteristics, used in the construction of the index k.
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Policy Functions Tables 6 and 7 summarize the probits for quality changes and
the entry and exit policies. For entry, the coe¢ cients are in general signicant
although their interpretation is not direct because we are interested in the reversed
probability Pr(entry j N) and also because in ordered probit models the sign of
the marginal e¤ect does not always coincide with the sign of the coe¢ cient for
the intermediate categories. For exit, the interpretation varies depending on the
segment considered, but in general the parameters are signicant. Regarding the
probit for investment, the probability of investing increases with the level of k and is
decreasing in the distance to the mean. It seems that models with a large endowment
of characteristics are modied more frequently and last longer than smaller cars. At
the same time, cars that are too di¤erentfrom their competitors are more likely
to quit and less likely to be modied.
I choose cubic B-splines because of their exibility and computational simplicity.
Splines are interpolation methods used to make predictions of a variable based on
other(s) when the functional relation between them is not known. (see Judd (1998)
chapter 6 or Cheney and Kinkaid (1985) chapter 7 for a survey). B-splines are
dened with reference to a set of knots. A k-degree B-spline is just a set of di¤erent
k-degree polynomials, one for each of the intervals dened by the set of knots. It
has the property that the derivatives from 0 to k   1 at each knot are the same for
contiguous polynomials. This produces smooth interpolations.
I use cubic B-splines with 20 interior knots to tabulate the investment policy
function. I construct a grid for the explicative variable with precision 10 5 and then
I compute the predicted value of investment for each element in the grid using the
cubic B-splines. The tabulated policy stays in memory and it is called when a value
for predicted investment is needed. The grid is ne enough as the explicative variable
does not show signicant variability further than the 4th or 5th decimal place. There
is no particular economic interpretation to be given to those parameters, but they
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provide a good t of the tabulated investment policy to the observed one.
Prices and market shares have no dynamic implication and are solved every
period given the level of k . Unfortunately, there is no explicit analytical expression
of p as function of k within the logit framework. Therefore, I again use cubic B-
splines to obtain p as a tabulated function of k5, pi = pi (ki).
In generating the simulated paths, a random shock or bias is added to each of the
three policies. For entry and exit, I draw from a random uniform distribution. For
investment, I draw from a lognormal distribution (in fact, this is as if it were a bias
over the level of k; thats the reason for assuming log-normality). The cuto¤ values
for entry, exit, and investment policies are also drawn from a uniform distribution,
rescaled in each case to meet sample moments.
The simulation of the alternative paths goes as follows: I draw initial values for k
from a lognormal distribution. With these initial values, I can use policy functions
to obtain the correspondent price and exit decisions. Then I only have to recur-
sively apply the policy functions until a whole history for all rms (incumbents and
potential entrants) is lled up. I repeat the same process for the same initial state
but this time adding a small random shock to the policies to simulate alternative,
non-optimal paths. I do it for 132 periods (months). Given a simulated history, I
can compute the market shares for each rm. Then I can compute the Wij vector
in equation (10) as the di¤erence between the present discounted values from the
actual and the alternative histories. The discount factor is the monthly equivalent
of a 10% annual interest rate. During the 1990s, interest rates in Spain ranged from
3% in 2000 up to values close to 10% at the beginning of the decade. I stick to the
conservative perspective.
5Alternatively, the rst-order conditions could be solved numerically for p, at the cost of in-
creasing the computational burden.
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4.6.2 Estimates of Dynamic Parameters
The equilibrium condition (11) and its empirical counterpart can be constructed
with the simulated histories. The minimization of (13) yields the vector of dynamic
parameters for investment cost and scrap value. Table 8 provides estimates for the
scrap value and investment cost parameters for the whole Spanish market. It turns
out that scrap values are moderate compared to industry prots. The implied price
elasticities combined with average prices in Table 4 yield margins roughly between
5000 and 8000 euros per car. This is equivalent to 5100   8200 units. The scrap
value in this context can be interpreted as what remains for a rm after it quits
a model. For example, a successful car may induce consumers to go to that rm
looking for the new model because of the positive image of the previous one. The
sell-o¤ value would be the value of the goodwill generated by the model quitting the
market.
The parameters for investment cost reveal a small or moderate cost of changing
characteristics. The large value of the coe¢ cient is just an e¤ect of the rescaling
of investment. In fact, the changes in k are usually small (on average, in absolute
value 0:18 with standard deviation 0:17) and magnitudes of 10 2 or much smaller
are frequent. Continuing with the High-Intermediate segment, the investment cost
of, for example, a change of 0:02 in k is 1 million e or, equivalently, the prots from
selling just 130  210 units.
Before discussing the results on entry cost, a word on the way they are computed
may be useful. I compute the EDV of introducing a product when the rm has no
other product (thus this is rm entry) and when the rm has up to ve products. In
the latter case, previous products are always in di¤erent segments than the one the
rm is currently entering (thus this is segment entry). I do this for each segment.
For example, I compute the EDV of entering segment 1 (the same for all other 7
segments) when the rm has no previous product in segment one, and when it has
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one product in another segment. In this latter case, there are 7 alternative situations
(the previous product being in each of the 7 remaining segments). Finally, each
of the alternative situations of entry described above is computed under di¤erent
industry structures,i.e., for alternative numbers of rival products in the segment of
entry. For example, I compute de EDV of rm one introducing its second product
in segment 1 when its rst product is in segment 6 and the number of rival products
in segment 1 (the segment of entry) is 5. I do this for all the combinations of: 1)
segments; 2) the number of previous products in di¤erent segments (up to ve);
3) the number of rival products in the segment of entry. It is easy to see that
the number of alternative starting states becomes large as we allow for diversity:
with 8 segments, allowing for ve previous products at most and considering only
4 alternative numbers of competing products, we have 3840 di¤erent initial states
(8 (1+7+21+35+35+21)4). The initial states described above are generated
randomly. In the segment of entry and in the starting period, all rms are forced to
have only one product (they may introduce new products from period two onwards).
In all other segments, there is no constraint. For the entering rm, and in the case
it is allowed to have 2 or more previous products, these are forced to be in di¤erent
segments. This is to reduce the number of possible alternative combinations.
Once the alternative initial states are devised, the usual forward simulation pro-
cedure is used to compute the EDV of the product that has been introduced. The
EDVs are normalized such that they have variance 1. The empirical probability of
entry is computed using the policy function. The variable accounting for the number
of previous models is also easily obtained. All of this allows the estimation of (14).
The distribution of entry costs has a mean of 2; 439 million euros. In terms of
units of product, this is roughly equivalent to 304; 000 to 487; 000 units. Although
this may look large, it has to be taken into account that it corresponds to the cost of
entry of a rm for the rst time. Once the rm is established and operating in a given
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segment, the introduction of a second model in another segment is substantially
cheaper: the cost of entering a second product in a di¤erent segment is equivalent
to 271; 000   433; 000 units, 12:5% less. Entry costs remain low for the range of
products between 2 and 4 and tend to rise again with 5 products. These estimates
seem reasonable compared to the 10; 000 units per model sold on average every year
and the 50; 000 units per year for the most popular models of di¤erent rms.
So far, I have not computed standard errors for the dynamic parameters. I plan
to do it using non-parametric bootstrap which is robust to sampling error introduced
in the rst stage of estimation or induced by the simplication of the state space.
The results show that there exist economies of scope in commercialization and
that these economies tend to disappear as the prole of a rms product goes large
(Figure 1). Once a rm has entered the market, it has incentives to expand its range
of products. However, when the rm has products in 4 di¤erent segments, starting
to cover a fth segment does not turn out to be so cheap. It is easy to see the
implications in the automobile industry: we can see rms covering a wide range of
products, but not the full range of products because, as the results suggest, it is too
costly. Citroen may have a good prole of products in the low and medium-quality
segments but producing in all segments would imply it is also producing high-quality
cars, and it may not be prepared for that. On the other side, Mercedes Benz can be
good in luxury and sports cars but very bad in less expensive ones.
This suggests that some advantages can be obtained, among others, in the process
of commercialization and distribution, and not only at the productive plant level
(whose analysis is beyond the scope of this paper). It also provides an explanation
for the dramatic increase in the number of models for sale in the Spanish market
during the 1990s.
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4.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents a dynamic model of entry and exit for the Spanish car industry
that allows the computation of entry costs in di¤erent scenarios. In particular,
it permits the comparison between the cost of rm entry, understood as the cost
of introducing the rst product, and the cost of introducing a second and further
models. This di¤erence gives a measure of the scope economies in commercialization,
and a quantication of the advantages of being an incumbent when a rm is about
to introduce new products. The estimation strategy is based on the methodology
proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). The results show that entry costs
are moderate and that there is a substantial reduction in the cost of introducing a
second product with respect to the introduction of the rst product. The advantage
extends to the third, fourth, and fth product and seems to be exhausted when the
rm wants to introduce a sixth one. This gives support to the idea of rms having
an optimal number of products and can also explain product proliferation in the
automobile industry.
There are some issues that call for future work. Firstly, a more exible approach
to demand estimation may help to obtain better estimates of price elasticities, in
line with Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Secondly, the paper shows results for
entry costs in di¤erent segments, but the same framework can be used to compute
the costs of introducing the second, third, etc. product in the same segment. This
would provide a measure of the advantages of incumbent rms in product replace-
ment by opposition to newcomers. In third place, standard errors for the estimated
parameters are needed. The most suitable technique seems to be the bootstrap,
even if it makes the problem more computationally burdensome. Finally, the model
should be extended to account for a previous development stage where the products
are technically devised before it is decided whether they will be introduced or not.
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Appendix: Pricing Equations and Prot Functions
in Nested Logit
Consider a multiproduct rm i facing nested logit demand and competing in prices.
Its objective function is:
i =
X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)SjM
where M is market size and g is segment from the total number of segments G.
Also: Sj=g is the share of product j in group g, Sig =
P
j2Gg
Sj , Si=g =
P
j2Gg
Sj=g is the
share of rm i in segment g, and Sg =
P
g2G
P
k2Gg
Sk is the share of group g, such that
Sj = Sg  Sj=g.
The FOC for the maximization problem of a multiproduct rm (several products
in several segments) under Nested Logit demand is:
(pj   cj)Sj = 1  g
g
Sj + gSj=g
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj
+(1  g)Sj
X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj ; 8j ; 8g (16)
Divide by Sj and rearrange Sj=g:
(pj   cj) = 1  g
g
+ g
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj=g + (1  g)
X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj ; 8j ; 8g
The three summands on the right hand side are equal for all products within the
same segment, but di¤erent across segments. Therefore, we can take (pj   cj) out
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of within-segment summations:
(pj   cj) = 1  g
g
+g (pj   cj)Si=g+(1  g)
X
g2G
(pj   cj)
X
j2Gg
Sj ; 8j ; 8g (17)
Now go back to (16), multiply by M and sum over g and j:
X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)SjM = M
X
g2G
1  g
g
Sig +M
X
g2G
g (pj   cj)SigSi=g
+
0@X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)SjM
1AX
g2G
(1  g)Sig
vari =M
X
g2G
1  g
g
Sig +M
X
g2G
g (pj   cj)SigSi=g + vari
X
g2G
(1  g)Sig (18)
Take (16) and sum over j:
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj = 1  g
g
Sig + g (pj   cj)SigSi=g
+
24(1  g)X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj
35Sig ; 8g
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj = 1
1  gSi=g
1  g
g
Sig
+
1
1  gSi=g
24(1  g)X
g2G
X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)Sj
35Sig ;8g (19)
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Substitute back in (18):
vari = M
X
g2G
1  g
g
Sig +
X
g2G
gSi=g
" 1 g
g
Sig
1  gSi=gM +
(1  g)vari (Sig)
1  gSi=g
#
+vari
X
g2G
(1  g)Sig
vari = M
X
g2G
1  g
g
Sig +
X
g2G
gSi=g
1 g
g
Sig
1  gSi=gM
+vari
X
g2G
gSi=g
(1  g)Sig
1  gSi=g + 
var
i
X
g2G
(1  g)Sig
"
1 
X
g2G
gSi=g
(1  g)Sig
1  gSi=g  
X
g2G
(1  g)Sig
#
vari = M
X
g2G
1  g
g
Sig
+
X
g2G
gSi=g
1 g
g
Sig
1  gSi=gM
(
1 
X
g2G

gSi=g (1  g)Sig + (1  g)Sig   gSi=g (1  g)Sig
1  gSi=g
)
vari =
= M
X
g2G
 
1  gSi=g
 1 g
g
Sig + gSi=g
1 g
g
Sig
1  gSi=g
(
1 
X
g2G

(1  g)Sig
1  gSi=g
)
vari =M
X
g2G
1 g
g
Sig
1  gSi=g
Then vari = f
 
g; g; Sj; Sj=g;M

. Rearrange (19) using the denition of vari :
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X
j2Gg
(pj   cj)SjM =
1 g
g
Sig
1  gSi=gM +
(1  g)Sig
1  gSi=g 
var
i ; 8g
varig =
1 g
g
Sig
1  gSi=gM +
(1  g)Sig
1  gSi=g 
var
i ; 8g
Now go back to (16):
(pj   cj)SjM = 1  g
g
SjM + 
var
ig gSj=g + 
var
i (1  g)Sj ; 8j ; 8g
Then:
varj =
1  g
g
SjM + 
var
ig gSj=g + 
var
i (1  g)Sj ; 8j ; 8g
where varig and 
var
i are the functions of market shares computed above.
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Tables
Table 1
Charac.: Description % of variation (year) % of variation (month)
CCKg Cubic centimeters by kilo 50.0% 3.8%
CarSize Length times width (m2) 36.9% 2.8%
KmL Kilometers driven by litre 47.7% 3.5%
Maxsp Maximum speed in Km/H 43.7% 3.1%
AC Air conditioning 27.3% 2.3%
ABS ABS 25.6% 2.1%
Overall 59.9% 4.8%
Table 2
% of monthly Overall
variation CCKG CarSize Kml MaxSp AC ABS % # changes # obs.
Small-Mini 2.2 2.0 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.7 3.2 19 587
Small 3.7 3.0 3.5 3.1 2.0 1.6 5.2 120 2310
Compact 3.7 2.8 3.7 3.3 2.4 2.1 5.0 147 2,959
Intermediate 3.7 3.0 3.9 3.4 2.7 2.8 5.1 75 1,480
High Interm. 3.8 2.8 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.0 4.6 146 3144
Luxury 3.7 2.6 3.4 3.0 1.6 1.8 4.4 141 3191
Sport 3.9 2.6 3.2 2.9 1.9 2.2 4.5 66 1,475
Minivan 4.9 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.9 3.0 6.1 74 1216
Overall 3.8 2.8 3.5 3.1 2.3 2.1 4.8 788 16362
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Table 3
Entry (%) Exit (%) Av. #models
Monthly Yearly Monthly Yearly
Small-Mini 1.2 13.2 0.9 9.4 4.6
Small 1.0 11.2 0.6 6.8 17.4
Compact 1.1 12.7 0.7 8.2 23.2
Intermediate 1.2 13.3 1.3 14.1 11.6
High Intermediate 0.9 10.2 0.4 4.4 24.8
Luxury 0.8 8.5 0.4 5.0 24.2
Sport 1.2 13.7 0.6 6.9 11.8
Minivan 2.3 25.2 0.2 2.7 16.7
Overall 1.1 12.3 0.6 6.7 19.6
Table 4
Mean Horse Real
Characteristics: CCKG CarSize Kml MaxSp AC (%) ABS (%) Power Price (e)
Small-Mini 1.355 5.321 20.9 143.6 0.5 0.0 48.8 6,301
Small 1.480 5.904 19.9 158.0 5.5 0.4 64.2 7,377
Compact 1.526 6.962 18.0 181.7 19.6 15.5 97.9 11,491
Intermediate 1.600 7.515 17.0 187.8 42.8 25.9 109.3 13,894
High Interm. 1.538 7.664 16.0 199.0 56.5 49.3 124.6 16,877
Luxury 1.711 8.497 14.1 213.6 86.3 75.5 165.9 27,272
Sport 1.768 7.592 14.9 217.6 88.4 78.0 170.2 27,519
Minivan 1.428 7.931 13.7 175.7 66.4 39.8 123.7 19,772
Overall 1.573 7.367 16.5 189.9 48.8 39.4 119.2 17,114
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Table 5: Demand estimation
Fixed e¤ects (within) IV regression Coe¢ cient Std. Dev.
Real price coe¢ cients:
Small-Mini  0:053 0:057
Small  0:051 0:026
Compact  0:136 0:015
Intermediate  0:124 0:021
High Intermediate  0:094 0:012
Luxury  0:064 0:007
Sport  0:155 0:011
Minivan  0:067 0:016
Intra-Group correlation:
Small-Mini 0:777 0:025
Small 0:792 0:034
Compact 0:739 0:025
Intermediate 0:742 0:022
High Intermediate 0:367 0:035
Luxury 0:948 0:028
Sport 0:707 0:033
Minivan 0:099 0:026
Characteristics:
Car Size 0:201 0:022
HP 0:009 0:0005
KmL 0:004 0:004
Air Conditioning 0:042 0:016
ABS 0:178 0:016
Controls:
Tari¤s 0:049 0:002
Constant  9:879 0:219
(; ; ; signicant at 10%, 5%, 1%)
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Table 6: Entry policy function
Pr (N j entry) Pr (N j no entry)
Average k by seg.
0:175
(0:150)
0:417
(0:015)
#models other seg.
1:282
(0:086)
1:165
(0:008)
cuto¤ 1
0:205
(0:508)
1:143
(0:052)
cuto¤ 2
1:618
(0:477)
2:192
(0:050)
cuto¤ 3
2:960
(0:494)
3:340
(0:051)
cuto¤ 4
4:389
(0:530)
4:733
(0:054)
cuto¤ 5
5:401
(0:561)
5:699
(0:058)
cuto¤ 6
6:473
(0:591)
6:903
(0:062)
cuto¤ 7
7:710
(0:636)
7:790
(0:065)
cuto¤ 8
9:052
(0:732)
8:760
(0:072)
cuto¤ 9
9:803
(0:781)
9:241
(0:076)
cuto¤ 10
10:890
(0:858)
10:498
(0:086)
cuto¤ 11
12:256
(1:062)
10:952
(0:090)
Observed rate of entry: 0:011
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Table 8: Dynamic Parameters
(Unit: millions of Euros) Coe¢ cient Economy (%)
Investment cost parameter  52:751
Scrap value 41:149
Mean rm entry cost 2; 439:805
Mean entry cost with:
1 product 2; 168:118 12:5
2 products 2; 218:291 10:0
3 products 2; 240:368 8:9
4 products 2; 229:832 9:4
5 products 2; 330:066 4:7
Figure 1: Mean entry cost by number of products.
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